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Lecture 
ENRICHING DISCOURSE 
ON PUBLIC DOMAINS 
PAMELA SAMUELSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Is there one public domain, or are there many? The scholarly 
literature predominantly assumes there is only one, for references 
abound to “the public domain” in the singular.1 Yet, even a cursory 
review of this literature reveals that scholars sometimes define this 
term differently.2 So if there is only one public domain, but many 
definitions, perhaps one objective of scholarly discourse about the 
public domain should be to seek consensus on the one “true” 
definition. 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Pamela Samuelson. 
 † Richard M. Sherman ‘74 Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University 
of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to James Boyle, David Lange, Arti Rai, and J.H. 
Reichman for giving me the opportunity to deliver the Kip and Meredith Frey Lecture at Duke 
Law School on March 26, 2005, on which this Lecture is based and for the inspiration their work 
has given me over the years. I am also grateful for the insightful comments on an earlier draft 
from colleagues who attended the St. Helena Cybercamp, co-sponsored by the Berkman Center 
for Internet and Society, and student commentators in the Intellectual Property Workshop at 
Boalt Hall. 
 1. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the 
Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie 
Guibault eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Duke Law Journal); David 
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981); 
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and 
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002); Malla Pollack, The 
Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern First Amendment and the Original 
Progress Clause (a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2004). 
 2. See, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 29–30 (Winter/Spring 2003) (giving examples of varying definitions of public domain). 
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Professor James Boyle has provocatively suggested that there are 
many public domains,3 and has urged scholars to develop a rich 
vocabulary for distinguishing among them. He points out that the 
word “property” has multiple meanings, and discourse about 
property proceeds without confusion because legal professionals have 
learned to discern from the textual context which meaning is 
intended.4 Boyle urges intellectual property scholars to develop a 
similarly nuanced public domain vocabulary so that it will be possible 
to distinguish among its several meanings as well.5 
In this Lecture, I consider the potential benefits of accepting the 
existence of multiple public domains and ways in which discourse 
about public domains might be enriched thereby. This Lecture 
represents a divergence from views expressed in my article, “Mapping 
the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities,” which I 
presented at Duke Law School’s Conference on the Public Domain in 
November 2001.6 That article assumed there was one public domain—
the one I mapped—that consisted of information resources free from 
intellectual property rights.7 The article acknowledged that other 
scholars had defined the term differently, but assumed others were 
simply using the term loosely.8 I accommodated other definitions by 
depicting them as occupying contiguous terrain to the public domain.9 
I had no doubt that mine was the right definition. 
When Professor Boyle endorsed multiple public domains at the 
Duke conference, I assumed that he was trying to be a good host to 
the scholars he had invited and to discourage us from fighting 
 
 3. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 4. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 30 (“The legal scholar will likely use the term ‘property’ in 
four or five distinct and well-understood ways, depending on the context: a property interest as 
any legally cognizable condition of market advantage; those rights protected by a ‘property rule’ 
rather than a ‘liability rule’; a variable bundle of rights of interest in things (and a bundle subject 
to almost unlimited state regulation and reformulation); any collection of privileges that 
includes market alienability, ‘sole, absolute and despotic dominion’ and so on.”). 
 5. Id. at 30–31; see also Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright 
Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 87 
(Winter/Spring 2003) (arguing for development of “an affirmative discourse that will make [the 
public domain] a positive and prominent part of the social and cultural landscape”). 
 6. Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 7. Id. at 151. 
 8. Id. at 149 n.14. 
 9. Id. 
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amongst ourselves over the “true” definition of this term. An open 
tent approach was more likely to foster stimulating scholarly 
discourse, and so it did.10 Yet, I believed then that without a clear and 
unambiguous definition of this term, public domain discourse would 
be incoherent and efforts to preserve such a domain might be 
ineffective because advocates of different public domains would be 
talking past one another.11 As I reread the burgeoning public domain 
literature, I came to see that there are some advantages, as well as 
some risks, to recognizing the existence of more than one public 
domain.12 This Lecture represents my reflections on the benefits and 
risks of recognizing multiple public domains. 
Part I provides a synopsis of thirteen conceptions of the public 
domain found in the law-review literature, explaining each, generally 
by reviewing its explication by its principal proponent or discoverer. 
Part II organizes the thirteen definitions by recognizing that they 
cluster around three main foci: (1) the legal status of information 
resources; (2) freedoms to use information resources, even if 
protected by intellectual property (IP) rights; and (3) accessibility of 
information resources. Although it is common to think of information 
resources as either IP-protected or public domain, and as either 
publicly accessible or not, Part II shows that the public domain 
literature views these concepts not as binary opposites, but rather as 
points along a continuum. Part III discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of recognizing multiple public domains and 
recommends appending adjectives to the term public domain to 
clarify discourse about which domain is intended. The constitutional 
public domain, for instance, is distinct from the privatizable (although 
not yet privatized) public domain. This Part offers reasons why some 
conceptions of public domains should be accepted whereas others, 
perhaps, should not. The principal advantage of recognizing multiple 
 
 10. See generally Symposium, The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
(Winter/Spring 2003) (analyzing the state of the public domain in the digital realm, examining 
the constitutionalization of the public domain, and discussing future directions for scholarship 
and research). 
 11. In this concern, I am not alone. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, 
and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114–
15 (Winter/Spring 2003) (emphasizing the importance of clear definitions of terms such as 
public domain and commons). 
 12. See Pamela Samuelson, Challenges of Mapping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (mapping 
different conceptions of public domain). 
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public domains is that it illuminates a range of important social values 
served by these domains and a plethora of strategies for preserving 
them and the values they serve. 
I.  SURVEYING THE MANY PUBLIC DOMAINS 
Professor David Lange wrote a seminal article more than twenty 
years ago that asked his audience to “recogniz[e] the public 
domain.”13 He was a pioneer in doing so.14 The sparseness of legal 
commentary on the public domain until very recently is somewhat 
surprising given that many judicial opinions had discussed the public 
domain as the status of informational works following expiration or 
invalidation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) or as the 
consequence of a claimant’s failure to satisfy substantive or 
procedural requirements for intellectual property protection.15 In the 
first decade or so after Lange’s article, the public domain literature 
grew only modestly.16 The main catalysts for the recent substantial 
 
 13. Lange, supra note 1, at 147. 
 14. A non-scholarly article predating Lange’s that recognized the public domain was M. 
William Krasilovsky, Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 205 
(1967) (arguing that the public domain in cultural affairs was not performing its function of 
broadening access to the arts). 
 15. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (“In 
essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse 
engineering of a product in the public domain.”); Compco Corp. v. Dey-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 
U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964) (noting that state laws may not protect “whatever the federal patent and 
copyright laws leave in the public domain”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
231 (1964) (“[An] unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the 
public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l 
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938) (“[U]pon the expiration of the . . . patent . . . the name of 
the patented article passed into the public domain.”). A rare statutory recognition of the public 
domain in the 1909 Copyright Act was a provision that “no copyright shall subsist in the original 
text of any work which is in the public domain.” Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (current 
version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)). 
 16. For the most notable contribution to the public domain literature in the first decade 
after Professor Lange’s article, see Litman, supra note 1. For other contributions to the 
literature during this period, see generally L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, THE 
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the 
Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of 
Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious 
Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994); L. Ray Patterson & Craig 
Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory 
Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1989); Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright 
Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 137 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Information As Property: 
Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in the Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 
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surge in scholarly interest in the public domain were Duke’s 
Conference on the Public Domain17 and the Supreme Court’s decision 
to hear Eric Eldred’s constitutional challenge18 to the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).19 International interest in 
public domain issues has also grown,20 although for somewhat 
different reasons.21 
 
365 (1989); and Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some 
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the First Amendment, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). 
 17. Symposium, supra note 10. 
 18. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Web-based publisher Eric Eldred challenged 
the retroactive grant of twenty additional years of exclusive rights for copyrights in existing 
works, arguing that the Constitution forbids a grant of exclusive rights without a quid pro quo of 
a newly original work to justify it; Eldred also argued that the lengthened copyright terms were 
virtually perpetual in violation of the “limited times” provision of the Constitution. See Brief of 
Petitioner at 9–11, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 32135676. Both before and after 
the Court’s decision in Eldred, there was an outpouring of scholarship about the constitutional 
law of intellectual property, including discussion of the constitutional status of the public 
domain. See generally Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional 
Power, and the Constitution, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing issues involved in the 
Eldred litigation and potential ramifications of the decision); Edward Lee, The Public’s 
Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control Public Access 
Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (2003) (noting a rise in the 
public’s interest in the public domain because of the Eldred case); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s 
First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2000) (laying out the background of the litigation 
and endorsing a balanced approach to copyright protection); Tyler Ochoa, Patent and Copyright 
Term Extension and the Constitution: An Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
19 (2002) (arguing that Congress may extend patent and copyright terms in limited 
circumstances); Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547 (2003) (suggesting that, despite Eldred, 
proponents of constitutional limits on copyright extension will succeed in the future); Paul M. 
Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and 
Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003) (arguing that the 
Court’s deferential approach in Eldred was appropriate); Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First 
Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 673 (2003) (studying the 
effect of Eldred on the treatment of aggressive copyright claims). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 20. See generally THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, at viii (Niva Elkin-Koren & 
Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) (exploring the “commercialization, commodification, and 
propertization” of information); INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith E. Maskus 
& Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (examining ways to preserve information public goods in the 
face of the increasing globalization of intellectual property rights); THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF 
INFORMATION, supra note 1 (providing international perspectives on ways to preserve the 
public domain). 
 21. Outside the U.S., Eldred had little significance because other nations do not have 
limiting constitutional provisions akin to that in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution. 
A catalyst for concern about the public domain outside the U.S. was a 1996 proposal for 
an international treaty to protect the contents of databases in line with the sui generis right that 
the EU adopted that year. See Council Directive 96/9, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (establishing 
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As the public domain literature has proliferated, so have 
definitions of the public domain. At least thirteen definitions or 
conceptions of the public domain are evident in this literature.22 Thus, 
 
new intellectual property right in contents of databases); see also Stephen M. Maurer, Across 
Two Worlds: US and European Models of Database Protection (2001) (manuscript on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (describing differing approaches to database protection in Europe and 
the United States); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 
369, 419–27 (1997) (discussing a proposed database treaty). 
A debate about the public domain that has been more active outside the U.S. than inside 
concerns whether to grant legal protection for traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples. See 
Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman, Toward an Indigenous Public Domain?, in THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(examining the relationship between indigenous intellectual property and the public domain); 
Manuela Carneiro de Cunha, The Role of UNESCO in the Defense of Traditional Knowledge, 
http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/Unesco/dacunha.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); World 
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. & 
Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, Composite Study on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/ 
en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_8.pdf; see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The 
Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2004) (criticizing public domain 
advocates for undervaluing the justice claims of indigenous peoples who want some control over 
Western exploitations of traditional knowledge, folklore, and plant genetic resources); infra 
notes 148–54 and accompanying text. 
 22. This Lecture does not differentiate between positive definitions of the public domain, 
such as Litman, supra note 1, at 967 (describing the public domain as the source of raw materials 
for new creations), and negative definitions, such as Samuels, supra note 16, at 137 (describing 
the public domain as what’s left over when all IP-protected information is subtracted). These 
conceptions are, in my view, subsets of public domains (PD) 1 and 2 infra. I have also omitted 
conceptions of the public domain as lands owned by the government, even though this was the 
original American meaning of this term. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 239 n.154. I do so to focus 
attention on informational public domains rather on land. For similar reasons, I do not include 
Professor Ann Bartow’s conception of public domain in her forthcoming article on trademarks 
and the physical public domain. See Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights & 
The Physical Public Domain (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript at 9, on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (using public domain to refer to public structures or places that are branded with 
corporate trademarks, such as Houston’s Minute Maid Park) 
A usage of public domain that is closer to those discussed in this article is that reflected in 
the title of an essay written by the current register of copyrights: 
When I say copyright has entered the public domain, I mean it is now on trial in the 
court of public opinion—the public is making judgments about whether copyright is a 
good thing or a bad thing. If they end up concluding that it is a bad thing—that it is an 
obstacle rather than an enabler of their access to creative works, then it won’t matter 
how right on the law copyright owners are—either the courts or Congress will begin 
to reflect that public sentiment, and the copyright owners could soon find that the law 
has been changed. 
Mary Beth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 701, 709 
(2004). Although this usage is distinct from the definitions discussed in this Lecture, it is a 
metaphorical usage that was not developed in the essay. 
Two other public domains I have conceived, but do not discuss further in this article, are a 
quasi public domain and an involuntary public domain. In Challenges of Mapping the Public 
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purely as a descriptive matter, Professor Boyle is correct in asserting 
that there are many public domains. Each of these definitions or 
conceptions is discussed below as a prelude to reflections on whether 
the proliferation of definitions or conceptions of the public domain is 
a blessing or a curse. 
A. Public Domain (PD) 1: Information Artifacts Wholly Free from 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Professor Boyle’s Second Enclosure article mentions that some 
definitions of the public domain focus on information artifacts 
unencumbered by intellectual property rights.23 This would include 
works in which IP rights have expired or are otherwise inoperative 
(e.g., because invalidated in litigation) and publicly disclosed works 
that do not qualify for IPRs for one or more reasons (e.g., because of 
insufficient originality for a copyright or unknown utility for a 
 
Domain, supra note 12, I discuss several categories of information whose intellectual property 
status is somewhat ambiguous, such as International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 
215, 236 (1918), which held news to be quasi-property as to a competitor, although common 
property as to the world, and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1979), 
which declared information to be in the public domain as to others, but not as to persons who 
contracted to pay for early disclosure and the right to use it. Ambiguous-status information 
could be considered as a quasi public domain. I have also imagined defining an involuntary 
public domain populated with, among other things, MP3 files of popular sound recordings 
traded via peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies and perhaps trade secrets published on the 
Internet. See Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, & Bryan Willman, The Darknet and 
the Future of Content Distribution, PROCEEDINGS OF ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT §§ 2.3, 2.4 (2002), http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (discussing 
peer-to-peer file sharing and the likely persistence of “darknet” trading of copyrighted digital 
content). Officially, commercial sound recordings are protected by copyright law in the US, but 
if they are as widely available as if they were public domain works, one could argue that they 
have been committed to an involuntary public domain. However, because neither the quasi 
public domain nor the involuntary public domain conception is presently recognized in the 
literature, neither is discussed further in this Lecture. 
 23. Boyle, supra note 3, at 59–60, 68. This public domain is aptly deemed “the opposite of 
property,” as the subtitle to Professor Boyle’s Symposium Foreword implies. See Boyle, supra 
note 2. Although Boyle does not cite to sources in which the public domain is so defined, 
Black’s Law Dictionary is one such source. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (7th ed. 1999) 
(“The universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected by intellectual property 
rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge.”); see also 1 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:2 (3d ed. 1996) 
(defining public domain as “the status of an invention, creative work, commercial symbol, or 
any other creation that is not protected by any form of intellectual property”). Notice that the 
definition from Black’s reifies this public domain as coextensive with artifacts, whereas 
Professor McCarthy’s, although also focused on artifacts (and not ideas, information, etc.), 
emphasizes an IP-free legal status as a core part of his definition of public domain. 
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patent).24 This can be thought of as the public domain of the 
ineligibles and the expireds. 
This public domain definition excludes information, ideas, 
principles, and laws of nature.25 One might justify this exclusion by 
saying that ideas and information, as such, are immaterial, lack clear 
boundaries, and are incapable of possession except in the mind.26 
Ideas and information are, moreover, typically embodied in 
information artifacts, such as texts or databases, which will either be 
in copyright or in an IP-free public domain. Because ideas or 
information do not generally have a tangible existence separate from 
the artifacts in which they are embodied, it is perhaps an artifice to 
conceptualize them as though they did. There may also be a 
granularity reason to exclude ideas and information from a public 
domain.27 That is, ideas and information may be too small in “grain 
size” to be IP-protected or public domain works.28 In any event, a 
public domain may fairly be defined as consisting of IP-free 
information artifacts.29 Eric Eldred, after all, wanted to put on the 
Internet about-to-be-public-domain information artifacts—such as 
short stories written in the 1930s, copyrights in which were about to 
expire and which would have expired but for the CTEA—rather than 
raw data or unembodied ideas.30 
 
 24. For cases expressing this principle, see supra note 15. 
 25. Professor Boyle raises the question of whether the public domain “consist[s] only of 
works that are completely unprotected, say books whose copyright term has lapsed,” or also 
includes “aspects of works that are unprotectable, such as ideas or facts.” Boyle, supra note 3, at 
59–60. 
 26. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 5, at 80 (“How could ideas, which have no bounds or marks 
or anything that is capable of visible possession, give rise to a common-law right of property?”); 
see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 163 (1992) (“[R]ecent developments evidence insufficient 
attention to the need for sharp lines and boundaries . . . .”). 
 27. See generally, e.g., Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2005) (explaining why small-grain-size original works, such as sentences 
or titles, should not qualify for copyright protection). 
 28. Boyle mentions granularity as a factor in analysis of ideas as public domain contents. 
Boyle, supra note 2, at 30. 
 29. One can, however, object to this definition of public domain for reifying an abstraction 
and blurring the distinction between legal status of a work and artifacts embodying the work. 
 30. Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. CA 99-0065 (JLG)), 
aff’d 239 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_orig.html. 
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B. PD 2: IP-Free Information Resources 
The most common definition of an informational public domain 
includes—along with IP-free information artifacts—ideas, 
information, concepts, principles, laws of nature, and the like.31 To 
distinguish this public domain from that just discussed, I will speak of 
it as the public domain of “IP-free information resources.” 
Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in International News Service v. 
Associated Press32 contains a classic rationale for denying legal 
protection to ideas and information: “The general rule of law is, that 
the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to 
others, free as the air to common use.”33 The modern Supreme Court 
accepts this proposition. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
 
 31. Many scholars include ideas, information, and the like in their definition of public 
domain. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19) (“Words, facts, idea, and preexisting 
knowledge were public property, common property or publici juris, as were materials published 
without satisfaction of copyright formalities or patent eligibility requirements.”); Ochoa, supra 
note 1, at 217–21 (“Copyright law does not protect works (or specific elements of works) which 
are not original, which consist of familiar or expected clichés, or which are (as a practical 
matter) indispensable to the expression of an idea.”); Samuelson, supra note 6, at 151 (mapping 
that which is within the public domain, including, among other things, “[i]deas, [c]oncepts, [and 
t]heories”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the 
Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 312–15 (2004) (“[C]opyright law similarly creates 
ownership rights only in the author’s expression, leaving the ideas and facts contained in the 
work in the public domain.”). Professor Ochoa points out that the public domain is a relatively 
recent term for IP-free information artifacts and that the terms common property and public 
property were more commonly used to describe the IP-free status of information artifacts in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 232–39. Ochoa attributes to 
Judge Learned Hand the conception of ideas as public domain information resources. Id. at 244. 
Hand’s frequent use of the term “public domain” (or the minor variant “public demesne”) in his 
influential decisions coincides with the rise of the term public domain for IP-free information 
resources and the demise of the terms common property and public property. Id. at 243–46. 
 32. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 33. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Similar sentiments were expressed in the mid-
eighteenth century by Lord Camden: “If there be any thing in the world common to all 
mankind, science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and 
general as air or water.” Rose, supra note 5, at 80 (quoting WILLIAM CORBETT, XVII THE 
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND col. 999 (London, R. Bragshaw 1813)). Thomas 
Jefferson expressed similar sentiments, which are widely quoted in the public domain literature. 
See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 3, at 53 (“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all 
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an 
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone . . . .” (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
326, 333–34 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed. 1907))). 
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Enterprises,34 for example, the Court reconciled copyright’s 
restrictions on free speech with the First Amendment’s mandate of 
free expression by observing that copyright protected only authors’ 
expression, not their ideas, the latter being freely usable by anyone 
without permission and without charge.35 Similarly, in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,36 the Supreme Court 
opined that “raw facts [in copyrighted works] may be copied at will,” 
saying that “[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the 
means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.”37 
As in Harper & Row, the Court in Feist emphasized that “copyright 
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages 
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a 
work.”38 Given the Supreme Court’s endorsement of ideas and 
information as part of a public domain, it is not surprising that many 
IP scholars define the public domain to include them. 
C. PD 3: The Constitutionally Protected Public Domain 
The Eldred case generated considerable interest in and 
scholarship about the constitutional status of the public domain.39 
Even before Eldred, there was general agreement that the Founders 
intended to build protections of the public domain (in the sense of IP-
free information resources) into the Constitution by providing that 
exclusive rights can only be granted to “authors” and “inventors,” 
and then only for “limited times.”40 Compilations of data that lack a 
modicum of creativity are, if one takes the Supreme Court at its word 
 
 34. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 35. Id. at 556–57. 
 36. 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 37. Id. at 350. 
 38. Id. at 349–50. 
 39. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 19, at 99 (noting that Eldred has sparked an “intense public 
debate” over the public domain); Ochoa, supra note 1, at 255–56 (commenting on the 
significance of the Eldred decision to the current state of public domain law); Zimmerman, 
supra note 31, at 329–31 (addressing Eldred’s significance in the debate surrounding 
constitutional protection of the public domain); see also Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking 
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 173, 201 (Winter/Spring 2003) (declaring Eldred’s importance in “settl[ing] the core 
question of the relationship between the Constitution and the line demarcating the boundary 
between the public and proprietary domains”). 
 40. Paul Heald & Suzanne Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual 
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1120; Robert 
P. Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000). 
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in Feist, not just unprotected by the Copyright Act of 1976, but 
unprotectable as a matter of constitutional law.41 The makers of such 
compilations do not qualify as “authors” because their works lack the 
creative originality that is a sine qua non of constitutional 
authorship.42 In Graham v. John Deere Co.,43 the Supreme Court 
spoke of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution as both “a 
grant of power and a limitation.”44 The Court indicated that 
“[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of 
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by 
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of. . . useful 
Arts.’”45 Congress may also “not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain.”46 
The “limited times” requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, 
means that Congress cannot grant perpetual protection in writings or 
inventions.47 The Eldred case considered whether extending the terms 
of existing copyrights by another twenty years violated this “limited 
times” requirement. The new term of copyright after enactment of 
the CTEA48 is, of course, a limited time in a literal sense. But Eldred 
argued, among other things, that the new term was virtually 
perpetual,49 and hence, conflicted with this limiting principle of the 
 
 41. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 109, 119 (1991) 
(noting that the Court invoked the Constitution thirteen times in explaining why unoriginal 
compilations such as white pages listings in telephone directories are ineligible for copyright 
protection). Whether Congress could grant makers of unoriginal compilations exclusive rights to 
control the extraction and reuse of the contents of databases, such as that involved in Feist, has 
been the subject of scholarly debate. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of 
Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights 
in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539–49 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacks the 
power to protect unoriginal databases); James Weinstein, The Constitutionality of Database 
Protection, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305, 349–50 (2003) (concluding that database protection 
would be constitutional). 
 42. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351 (“[O]riginality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for 
copyright protection.”). 
 43. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. Id. at 6. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 40, at 1120 (arguing that it is “self-evident” that 
“limited times” is a constitutional constraint on congressional power). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (providing authors with protection for their lifetimes plus 70 
years). 
 49. Brief for Petitioners at 17–19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf; see 
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Constitution. Because Congress had extended copyright terms several 
times in the past, the Court decided that historical practice should 
inform the Court’s conception of Congress’s constitutional power.50 
Yet, the Court in Eldred recognized that there were constitutional 
limitations on Congress’s power to protect writings.51 As in Harper & 
Row, the Court suggested that Congress could not, consistent with the 
First Amendment, grant copyright owners exclusive rights in ideas or 
eliminate the fair use exception.52 
Among the broadest conceptions of the constitutionally 
protected public domain is that articulated by Professor Diane 
Zimmerman.53 Her “mandatory public domain” includes ideas, 
information, works as to which copyrights or patents have expired, 
and certain government proceedings, laws, regulations, and judicial 
opinions.54 What makes this public domain mandatory is that “what 
goes into [this public domain] must stay there.”55 Zimmerman 
believes that the “baseline presumption” for constitutionally 
protected public domain contents is “that its contents can be used 
without permission and without charge.”56 
 
also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ 
eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf (“[T]he current copyright term already has nearly 
the same present value as an infinite copyright term.”). 
 50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202–05. 
 51. Id. at 219–20. 
 52. Id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985)). 
 53. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 373–75. Among the other scholars who have endorsed a 
constitutionally protected public domain are Benkler, supra note 41, at 536–37; Heald & Sherry, 
supra note 40, at 1157; Lee, supra note 19, at 102; Pollack, supra note 1, at 28–29. An even 
broader conception of the constitutionally protected public domain can be found in the work of 
Malla Pollack. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method 
Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 119–20 (2002). 
 54. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 300, 312, 336–42, 371. Professor Zimmerman considers 
ideas, information, theories, and scientific principles to be “First Amendment public domain” 
materials, characterizing this conclusion as “‘pre-theoretical’ because it is so intertwined with 
the possibility of speaking for any purpose that no theory of the First Amendment could be 
implemented without it.” Id. at 326. Zimmerman relies on other constitutional provisions as 
“requir[ing] that some information affirmatively be given to the public, and to remain available 
without restrictions on its subsequent use,” such as publishing the Congressional Record and 
public reports of the president. Id. at 340. 
 55. Id. at 372. Ochoa speaks of the constitutionally protected public domain as 
“irrevocable.” Ochoa, supra note 1, at 262–64. 
 56. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 370. 
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D. PD 4: Privatizable Information Resources 
Professor Zimmerman may be right that many information 
resources in the public domain must stay there and are 
constitutionally protected from privatization,57 but it is a substantial 
stretch to say that the whole of the public domain is unprivatizable 
and constitutionally protected. Some information resources in the IP-
free public domain are susceptible to being privatized, although no 
scholar has, until this Lecture, explored the privatizable public 
domain or attempted to define it. Yet, if the constitutional public 
domain deserves to be recognized and defined, as so many scholars 
seem to believe, then a privatizable public domain may also be worth 
recognizing. 
Among the information resources that were in an IP-free public 
domain for many years before they became privatized are business 
methods.58 In the past, business methods, like other public domain 
information resources, could be copied at will once revealed to the 
public. This changed with the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.59 Business 
methods are now patentable in the U.S., and many are now 
patented.60 Similarly, the layout of circuits in semiconductor chips was 
in an IP-free public domain prior to enactment of the Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA)61 (unless patented, which they 
rarely were).62 After SCPA passed, original chip designs were eligible 
 
 57. The Supreme Court has rejected two recent attempts to use trademark or unfair 
competition law to protect works that were in the public domain owing to expired copyright and 
patent rights. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003) 
(holding that the failure to attribute authorship of a television program whose copyright had 
expired when marketing a derivative work could not be enjoined because it was not a 
misleading designation of the product’s origin); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) (holding that a functional design disclosed in an expired patent 
could not be protected as trade dress). 
 58. See, e.g., Loew’s Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st 
Cir. 1949) (holding that business methods are unpatentable abstract ideas); Pollack, supra note 
53, at 69 (offering several rationales for rejecting business method patents). 
 59. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see id. at 1375 (holding that business methods are 
patentable subject matter). 
 60. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 987, 990–91 (2004).  
 61. Pub. L. No. 98-620, Tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901–914 
(2000)). 
 62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 3, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5752 
(explaining why patent law was insufficient to protect chips). See generally Symposium, The 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons, 70 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1985) (“The 
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for the sui generis (of its own kind) form of intellectual property 
protection created by this law.63 Boat hulls were similarly public 
domain artifacts (unless patented) until Congress in 1998 created 
another sui generis form of intellectual property protection to protect 
them.64 This legislation may have been unwise, but the newly created 
property right has not been challenged on the ground that they are 
part of a constitutionally protected public domain.65 
The right of publicity is a common law intellectual property right 
that, in essence, allows celebrities to appropriate information 
resources, such as their names and likenesses, among other attributes 
of their personae, from the public domain.66 Noncelebrities generally 
do not having publicity rights because they have not invested time, 
money and energy in the creation of a commercially valuable 
persona.67 The names and likenesses of ordinary people may be in an 
IP-free public domain, although protected by privacy laws against 
some appropriations.68 Yet upon becoming celebrities, their names 
and likenesses may be and often are propertized. Tiger Woods, for 
example, was not born famous; he became so. When he was 
unknown, his likeness was in a public domain; yet, when his likeness 
 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 . . . reflects the congressional goal of providing 
particular protection for the costly and time-consuming process of designing the circuitry of 
semiconductor chips.”) 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a), 903–904 (2000). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332. It is questionable whether the boat hull legislation would have 
passed the Kastenmeier/Remington test for sui generis legislation. See Robert W. Kastenmeier 
& Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm 
Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 440–41 (1985) (arguing for a test in which “the proponent of a 
new interest ought to show that the interest can fit harmoniously within the existing legal 
framework[,] . . . [provide] a reasonably clear and satisfactory definition[,] . . . present an honest 
analysis of all the costs and benefits of the proposed legislation[,] . . . [and] show on the record 
how giving protection to that interest will enrich or enhance the public domain”). 
 65. There was, however, some discussion in the legislative history of SCPA about whether 
Congress had the power to enact that legislation. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 10, as reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5759. See generally RICHARD H. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP 
PROTECTION 41–45 (1986) (discussing the constitutionality of the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act). 
 66. See generally THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 
(2005) (defining and discussing the right of publicity). 
 67. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that the right of publicity is only available to those who have attained celebrity); Martin Luther 
King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) 
(“[P]rivate citizens have the right of privacy, [whereas] public figures have a similar right of 
publicity.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1890) (holding that 
the appropriation of a likeness for advertising purposes violated the right of privacy). 
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became commercially valuable, Woods was able to privatize it 
through right-of-publicity law.69 
Trademark law resembles right of publicity law in that persons 
(or firms) can acquire exclusive rights in names and symbols that 
were initially public domain information resources. Descriptive 
names, for example, may, after some years of use, come to signify the 
origins of goods or products, thereby acquiring secondary meaning 
that enables them to serve as trademarks.70 McDonald’s and 
International Business Machines are examples of now famous marks 
that were once too descriptive to be protected as trademarks. 
When Jack Valenti, longtime head of the Motion Picture 
Association of America, characterized the public domain as “an 
orphan,”71 he meant to convey that in the absence of intellectual 
property protection, there would be too little incentive to invest in the 
preservation and continued public distribution of culturally significant 
information artifacts, such as 1930s motion pictures.72 Professor Julie 
Cohen has pointed out that this view conceives of intellectual 
property law as a form of cultural stewardship of valuable 
information resources, which prevents those 1930s movies from 
languishing in MGM’s archives.73 Allowing privatization of what 
would otherwise be public domain works through, for example, 
extension of copyright terms, in this conception, promotes progress 
by fostering continued availability of commercially valuable works.74 
 
 69. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937–38 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that Woods had publicity rights in his image, but concluding that a painting of him golfing was 
protected expression under the First Amendment). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9, 13–14 (1995). 
 71. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on 
Copyright Term Extension, H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 53 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President 
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
legacy/447.htm. 
 72. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. in 
Support of Respondent at 21, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/mpaa.pdf (arguing that 
copyright term extension promotes progress of science and useful arts by giving incentives to 
invest in film preservation). 
 73. See Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 23–29) (discussing the cultural stewardship 
rationale for copyright term extension). 
 74. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2003) (“The size of the public domain is in part a positive 
function of the extent of copyright protection, since, as a first approximation, the more 
extensive copyright protection is, the greater the incentive to create intellectual property—some 
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The cultural stewardship concept of public domain information 
resources is, as the Eldred litigation made clear, highly contested. 
E. PD 5: Broadly Usable Information Resources 
Professor Yochai Benkler is the principal expositor of an 
expansive view of the public domain as “the range of uses of 
information that any person is privileged to make absent 
individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular person 
unprivileged.”75 Benkler considers brief quotations of a copyrighted 
text in a critical book review, time-shift copying of television 
programming with a video recording device, and other “easy case” 
fair uses to be as clearly within the public domain as Mozart 
symphonies.76 The critical distinction for Benkler is between those 
information resources that are freely usable and those as to which an 
owner can exercise exclusive rights.77 
By this definition, a wide array of information resources 
available on the Internet and World Wide Web are public domain 
materials. Many sites, including those constructed by individuals to 
express their interests, those of public interest organizations such as 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and repositories of information 
artifacts such as the Internet Archive, make large volumes of 
information resources publicly accessible. In contrast with the 
“traditional, absolutist conception of the public domain,”78 Professor 
Benkler’s conception of the public domain encompasses information 
resources that, although IP-protected by copyright law, are privileged 
or implicitly licensed for common uses, such as downloading for 
personal use or linking. Benkler’s definition is intuitively appealing 
because it speaks to a commonality among informational freedoms, 
though they may be derived from different legal concepts. 
Professor Benkler’s conception of the public domain has 
resonated with authors outside the IP field who seek to persuade 
 
fraction of which will become a part of the public domain when the copyright expires or . . . is 
not renewed.”). 
 75. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361–62 (1999). Professor Robert P. 
Merges uses the public domain in a similarly broad way in A New Dynamism in the Public 
Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004). 
 76. Benkler, supra note 75, at 361–62. Benkler excludes from this definition contested uses 
that might ultimately be deemed fair or otherwise privileged after protracted litigation. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Boyle, supra note 3, at 61. 
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members of the public to support a new and more public-regarding 
politics of intellectual property.79 The Internet, in this view, has 
“dramatically extended the traditional functions of the public 
domain” by providing a communications medium through which 
more people than ever before have become authors and publishers of 
interesting content.80 “Paleontologists and rare book collectors, fans 
of Peggy Lee and anti-globalization activists, cat lovers and Marxist 
theorists all have their place at the new [public domain] table.”81 By 
taking advantage of the open infrastructure of the Internet, 
“remarkable creativity and useful information arise spontaneously, 
confounding neoclassical economists who believe that valuable works 
simply will not be created without strict property rights and 
markets.”82 This public domain is dynamic and expanding as advances 
in information technologies extend uses to which information can be 
put.83 
F. PD 6: Contractually Constructed Information Commons 
Some commentators consider open source software and 
information artifacts made widely available under Creative Commons 
(CC) and similar licenses to be in the public domain.84 The more 
sophisticated proponents of this conception of the public domain 
recognize that open source software and CC-licensed content are not 
public domain in the sense of the first definition in this Lecture. 
Authors of open source and Creative Commons works invoke 
intellectual property rights as the source of authority for the license 
terms under which they make their information artifacts widely 
 
 79. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, WHY THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MATTERS: THE ENDANGERED 
WELLSPRING OF CREATIVITY, COMMERCE AND DEMOCRACY 5 (2002) (explaining the 
importance of the public domain in “everyday activities”); DAVID BOLLIER & TIM WATTS, 
SAVING THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A NEW PUBLIC INTEREST AGENDA IN DIGITAL 
MEDIA 7 (2002) (noting the rise of information commons that are widely accessible to the 
public); NANCY KRANICH, THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 32–35 
(2004) (arguing for a broad public domain). 
 80. BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 24. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 14 (arguing that open source software is fortifying and expanding the 
public domain); BOLLIER & WATTS, supra note 79, at 49–52 (describing free and open source 
software and Creative-Commons-licensed materials as within the public domain); see also 
Merges, supra note 75, at 190–93 (discussing open source as an example of the new dynamism of 
the public domain). 
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available.85 The right to use and modify open source or free software, 
for example, is typically conditioned on the licensee’s agreement to 
make source- as well as object-code versions of the program and 
derivative works publicly available; developers of derivative software 
must also impose the same conditions on any subsequent licensee.86 
Open source licenses vary on many terms,87 although the Open 
Source Initiative has sought to standardize core terms that should be 
included before the software is designated as open source.88 Richard 
Stallman, author of the widely used GNU software, has promulgated 
the General Public License (GPL) as the standard for distributing 
“free” software, including the GNU/Linux operating system.89 
Creative Commons builds on the open source concept by 
providing creators an easy way to make their works available with 
some, rather than all, rights reserved. To achieve this goal, it provides 
creators with several license options. Some allow noncommercial, but 
not commercial, uses of CC-licensed material; some allow derivative 
works to be made, whereas others do not.90 CC-licensed materials in 
digital form carry technically encoded instantiations of the licenses so 
that computers can discern the usability of CC-licensed content. 
Open source, CC, and similar licensed materials are best 
understood as contractually constructed information commons. 
Because they promote openness and widespread uses, these 
information resources are regarded by some commentators to be 
functionally similar enough to IP-free public domain materials to be 
included in the definition of this term.91 Even those who might 
 
 85. See, e.g., Michael Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
275, 282–87 (2003) (explaining the open source model of software licensing). 
 86. A variety of open source software licenses is available at the Open Source Initiative 
(OSI) website, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/apl1.0.php. OSI owns a certification mark 
and has established a process for determining which licenses conform to the definition of “open 
source.” See The Open Source Definition, http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.html (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2006) (describing the criteria software must meet to be open source). 
 87. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 69–71 (2005) (describing various types of open source 
licenses). The General Public License (GPL) is, for example, more restrictive than many open 
source licenses because it does not permit certain kinds of commercialization of derivative 
works or intermixing GPL and proprietary software. 
 88. Open Source Definition, supra note 86. 
 89. See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (explaining the GPL). 
 90. The license options provided by Creative Commons are available at Choosing a 
License, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006). 
 91. E.g., Merges, supra note 75, at 186. 
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question whether contractually constructed commons should be 
included in a definition of public domain would likely agree that such 
commons promote public domain values. 
Contractually constructed information commons can be much 
more complex and highly regulated than open source or CC-licensed 
content. An example is the science commons intended to function as 
a public domain that Professor Jerome H. Reichman and Dr. Paul F. 
Uhlir envision for scientific data.92 Reichman and Uhlir point out that 
scientific data, analysis, and results have traditionally been in an IP-
free public domain.93 Governmental policies have, moreover, 
generally promoted broad and open access to IP-free public domain 
scientific data in two ways: The government itself collects and 
disseminates vast quantities of scientific data in which it claims no 
exclusive rights,94 and it also funds research at universities and other 
research institutions under grant agreements that encourage data 
sharing.95 
The traditional functions of the public domain of science have 
been undermined, Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir believe, by 
“progressive privatization and commercialization of scientific data[] 
and . . . the attendant pressures to hoard and trade [data] like other 
private commodities.”96 The pressures come in part from new and 
stronger forms of legal and technical protections for databases that 
“pose the danger of disrupting the normative customs at the 
foundation of public science, especially the traditional cooperative 
and sharing ethos.”97 Although the U.S. has not enacted an 
 
 92. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for 
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 315, 317–25 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 93. Id. at 319–20; see also Pamela Samuelson, Preserving the Positive Functions of the 
Public Domain in Science, 2 DATA SCI. J. 192, 196 (2003) (“Whether in Europe or in the United 
States, scientists need to work with legislatures considering anti-circumvention legislation to 
ensure that it contains appropriate exceptions for scientific research.”). 
 94. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (stating that works of the U.S. government are not eligible 
for copyright). 
 95. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 318. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2003) (discussing the impact of scientific 
and technical data in the public domain on education and research). 
 96. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 319. 
 97. Id. at 320, 366–94. 
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intellectual property regime to protect the contents of databases,98 the 
EU has.99 Reichman and Uhlir believe that the scientific community 
cannot afford to assume the U.S. will not do the same in the future. In 
any event, expansive interpretations of copyright law, use of access 
controls bolstered by anticircumvention regulations, and restrictive 
database licensing agreements have limited access to and reuses of 
hitherto public domain resources, such as scientific data.100 
In the face of the increasingly protectionist legal and business 
environment for databases of scientific significance, Professor 
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir propose that scientific research communities 
reconstruct the traditional research commons of the public domain by 
contractually binding members of relevant research communities to 
form a commons by licensing the scientific data they produce to 
repositories to preserve open access, rights to extract and reuse data, 
sharing of research data and results, and other public domain 
values.101 Reichman and Uhlir draw upon the insights of Charlotte 
Hess and Professor Elinor Ostrom who observe that creating a 
commons may require “[d]evising property regimes that effectively 
allow sustainable use of a common-pool resource” which in turn 
“requires one set of rules that limits access to the resource system and 
another set of rules that limits the amount, timing, and technology 
used to withdraw diverse resource units from the resource system.”102 
Reichman and Uhlir offer detailed suggestions about how a science 
commons might be created and maintained. 
G. PD 7: A Status Conferring a Presumptive Right of Creative 
Appropriation 
Scientists are not the only creative people who rely on public 
domain information resources. The public domain literature is replete 
with concerns about the ability of follow-on creators to draw upon 
preexisting information resources in making new works. More than 
two decades ago Professor David Lange worried that expansive 
 
 98. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51, 52–58 (1997) (discussing proposed U.S. database protection legislation). 
 99. Council Directive 96/9, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. For a discussion of the impact of this 
directive on the EU database industry, see, for example, Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz, & Harlan J. Onsrud, Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 SCIENCE Oct. 26, 2001, at 
789. 
 100. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 371–95. 
 101. Id. at Part IV. 
 102. Hess & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 121. 
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publicity rights would limit the ability of artists to express 
themselves.103 Andy Warhol’s portraits of famous people such as 
Elizabeth Taylor would, for example, be threatened if the law gave 
celebrities exclusive rights to control all depictions of their 
likenesses.104 Professor Jessica Litman similarly emphasizes the 
“central importance [of the public domain] in promoting the 
enterprise of authorship.”105 She criticizes the romantic view of 
originality, i.e., the notion that authors conjure up new works from 
nothing.106 She conceives of authorship instead as “a combination of 
absorption, astigmatism, and amnesia.”107 Because the public domain 
provides the raw material from which all creators draw, Litman 
believes this domain makes the rest of the IP system work.108 
Professor Lange has recently reimagined the public domain in a 
more proactive way.109 He no longer thinks of it as something that 
needs merely to be recognized or defined.110 Nor is he is content with 
conceiving of the public domain as a preserve or sanctuary in which 
creation can take place.111 To make the public domain more dynamic 
and robust, he now conceives it as “a status that arises from the 
exercise of the creative imagination . . . confer[ring] [on authors] 
entitlements, privileges and immunities” to appropriate from other 
works in the course of creating new ones.112 This status, he says, 
should be “independently and affirmatively recognized in law, 
sometimes collective in nature and sometimes individual, but 
 
 103. See Lange, supra note 1, at 165 (“As access to the public domain is choked, or even 
closed off altogether, the public loses too: loses the rich heritage of its culture, the rich presence 
of new works derived from that culture, and the rich promise of works to come.”). 
 104. A recent example of an expansive publicity rights claim against a creative artistic work 
is Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding publicity rights claim 
by Rosa Parks against a rap group that used her name in the title of its song and made reference 
in the lyrics to moving to the back of the bus). 
 105. Litman, supra note 1, at 968. 
 106. See id. at 965 (“Our copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create 
something from nothing . . . .”). 
 107. Id. at 1011. 
 108. Id. at 968. 
 109. David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463 
(Winter/Spring 2003). 
 110. Id. at 475. 
 111. Id. at 474. 
 112. Id.; cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2002) (“[T]he constitutional protection of art is best understood through a 
principle that I will call the freedom of imagination. Under this freedom, no one can be 
penalized for imagining or communicating what he imagines.”). 
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omnipresent, portable, and defining.”113 It should not just be an 
affirmative defense to charges of copyright infringement, but an 
affirmative right of authors to imagine and bring into being new 
works, even if they thereby incorporate parts of existing creations. 
“Creative appropriation would be presumptively privileged in every 
instance, without primary concern either for exploitation adversely 
affecting the economic value of an antecedent work or for the 
reputation or sensibilities of its author or proprietor . . . .”114 In so 
doing, Lange proffered a new public domain for scholarly 
consideration. 
H. PD 8: A Cultural Landscape 
Professor Julie Cohen shares Professor Lange’s concern about 
the ability of creators to draw upon existing works in the course of 
engaging in creative work. In recent work, she characterizes the 
public domain as “a policy construct intended to foster the 
development of artistic culture,”115 asserting that “a theory of the 
public domain must make sense when measured against the ways that 
creative practice works.”116 The proper approach to defining “the 
relationship between the proprietary and the public in copyright law 
is not to be derived by interrogating nineteenth-century legal 
concepts, nor by studying markets for creative products or modeling 
information as an autonomous system, but rather by more careful 
attention to creativity as a social phenomenon manifested through 
creative practice.”117 
Professor Cohen aims to locate the public domain in the context 
of creative practice, suggesting that it is best understood as an integral 
part of the cultural landscape in which creative practice occurs.118 The 
public domain “is not a discrete preserve, but rather a distributed 
property of social space.”119 Cohen also describes this space as 
“everywhere the public is,” and characterizes it as a “cultural 
 
 113. Lange, supra note 109, at 474. 
 114. Id. at 479 (quoting David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and 
Transformative Critical Appropriation (2001), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf 
(last visited on Jan. 6, 2006)). 
 115. Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (manuscript at 52). 
 118. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 119. Id. (manuscript at 41). 
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landscape.”120 Creators should have, Cohen believes, “baseline rights” 
to engage in “unplanned, fortuitous access and opportunistic 
borrowing” from this cultural landscape.121 The principal policy 
prescription that follows from her conception of the public domain 
can be succinctly stated: “If we as a society want to facilitate the 
development of artistic culture, copyright doctrine should recognize 
rights of access to the common in culture to a far greater extent than 
it currently does.”122 Copyright doctrine should accordingly be 
reformed to narrow the scope of protection that the law now provides 
to rights holders against those who reproduce portions of existing 
works in the course of preparing their own works, particularly those 
who make transformative derivative works.123 
I. PD 9: A Communicative Sphere 
Many eloquent musings about the public domain focus on its 
importance to deliberative democracy.124 Among the most recent 
contributions to this genre is an essay by Professor Michael Birnhack, 
in which he asserts that the public domain plays 
a crucial role in personal self-development, learning, experiencing, 
imagining, speaking with others, creating new works for the benefit 
of ourselves and wider circles, starting from the immediate 
interlocutor and up to the entire community. The public domain is 
the means and the end to “promote the progress of science” (in the 
U.S. Constitution’s formulation), or for “the encouragement of 
learning” (in the language of the Statute of Anne). It is where 
knowledge is created and where it lies awaiting new interpretations, 
 
 120. Id. (manuscript at 42). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 1 (“[T]he public domain has always been critical to 
new creativity, the progress of science and technology and the vitality of our democratic 
culture.”); KRANICH, supra note 79, at 1 (“Building the information commons is essential to 21st 
century democracy . . . .”); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political 
Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1262 (2003) (“The industrial model of mass media 
communications that dominated the twentieth century suffers from two types of democratic 
deficits that could be alleviated by a greater role for commons-based production.”); 
Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 310 (“[T]he personal and social values of autonomy and 
participation in self governance . . . are supported by access to a large commons . . . .”). 
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new applications and new meanings. It is not a graveyard, but a 
playground for speech-experiments.125 
The public domain and free speech are important, he thinks, not only 
because they foster self-actualization and progress of science, but also 
because both 
construct, or aim at constructing, a communicative sphere, where 
people can interact with each other in various circles, whether it is 
an interpersonal circle, a communitarian one or a wider political 
circle. In this sense, both the public domain and the idea of freedom 
of speech stem from the same source.126 
He thereby elevates the public domain to the same fundamental 
human right status as free speech.127 
Professor Birnhack explains his conception of the public domain 
as a communicative sphere by observing that: 
[B]oth copyright law and free speech jurisprudence aim at a rich and 
diverse public domain, in which deliberation can take place without 
any impediments, in which all who wish can participate, regardless 
of their market power. It is a public domain which is interested in 
the exchange between the multiple voices and their expressions, 
which realizes that new ideas form when old ideas interact. In other 
words, this is a public domain that rejects cultural control which is 
executed through the use of property rights; it is a public domain 
that is required by the best reading we can offer for both copyright 
law and for free speech jurisprudence. It is a public domain which 
enables new participants to join in, build on the existing work, and 
that acknowledges that repetition in a different context changes the 
meaning of a work, and thus should be considered a new work.128 
Birnhack’s conception of the public domain resembles Professor 
Lange’s and Professor Cohen’s in its concern about the implications 
of the public domain for self-actualization and freedom of expression, 
but his conception is less focused on individual creators and more on 
 
 125. Michael Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2–3) (citation omitted). 
 126. Id. (manuscript at 5). 
 127. Professor Birnhack seems to agree with Professor Zimmerman, supra note 31, about 
the constitutional status of the public domain, but like Professor Lange, supra note 109, and 
Professor Cohen, supra note 1, his public domain has a more affirmative character. It is not just 
a means of protecting an information resource from being privatized, but it provides a right to 
engage in public discourse and use information resources in doing so. 
 128. Birnhack, supra note 123 (manuscript at 34–35). 
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the societal infrastructure that more generally supports the lively 
discourse that Habermas famously characterized as the public 
sphere.129 
J. PD 10: Publication of Governmental Information 
Like Professor Birnhack, Professor Edward Lee is concerned 
with the implications of the public domain for deliberative 
democracy. Lee’s public domain, however, focuses on the publication 
of previously secret governmental information. Lee gives as an 
example of this public domain a judicial opinion critical of 
government investigations pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).130 Publication of this opinion131 contributed 
the knowledge it contained about government misconduct into a 
public domain. Lee’s public domain “helps to establish a legal 
restraint against government overreaching by ensuring the public’s 
access to materials that are essential for self-governance and a 
learned citizenry.”132 
Professor Lee is critical of public domain scholarship authored 
by intellectual property professors, characterizing it as “shortsighted” 
because it is too focused on a public domain of works free from 
IPRs.133 Lee points out that the public domain is an important concept 
in other areas of law, such as “First Amendment rights of access, 
government secrecy agreements, espionage law, laws regulating 
classified information and munitions lists, and the Freedom of 
Information Act.”134 Collectively, Lee regards the public domain as a 
safeguard against excessive government secrecy. “Injecting 
information into the public domain is the perfect antidote to 
government abuses that are carried out by means of secrecy. The 
 
 129. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger 
trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962). Although Mary Beth Peters, the U.S. Register of Copyrights, 
would surely disagree with much of Professor Birnhack’s analysis, her use of “public domain” in 
the title of a recent lecture (Copyright Enters the Public Domain) to indicate growing public 
awareness of and debate about copyright, somewhat resembles Birnhack’s conception of the 
public domain as a communicative sphere. See supra note 22. 
 130. Lee, supra note 18, at 94. 
 131. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
 132. Lee, supra note 18, at 97. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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public domain counters secrecy with public scrutiny.”135 Lee 
demonstrates that his public domain has historical antecedents 
worthy of consideration in the scholarly debate about public domains. 
K. PD 11: A Domain of Publicly Accessible Information 
Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, like 
Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir, are concerned with preserving the 
public domain of science.136 In a recent work, they consider whether 
the public domain of science has been harmed by the substantial 
surge in patenting of scientific and other technological innovations.137 
Some innovations now being patented, they assert, would in the past 
have been in an IP-free public domain. Increased patenting might 
seem to cause the public domain of science to shrink. Yet, patent law 
requires inventors to disclose their innovations and how to make 
them in order to qualify for IP rights, and patent disclosures advance 
knowledge. “What matters,” Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss suggest, “is 
whether the information a second comer needs is available for use” in 
a domain that might be called “the domain of accessible 
knowledge.”138 If increased patenting enlarges the domain of 
accessible knowledge, perhaps the public domain of science is 
enhanced, not harmed, by the additional patents.139 Dinwoodie and 
 
 135. Id. Lee contends that the public has vested interests in public domain information, id. 
at 119, and that “Congress has no power to remove material from the public domain through 
the grant of intellectual property rights,” id. at 205. He also argues for a public right of access to 
public domain information. Id. at 206–07. 
 136. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and 
the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY REGIME 861, 863 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (“Evaluating 
a broad range of approaches would allow us to fully probe the provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement to see which are most hospitable to protecting the public domain of science.”). 
 137. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the 
Domain of Accessible Knowledge in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 
(manuscript at 3, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 138. Id. Other works that consider policies for promoting public access to scientific 
knowledge include Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of 
Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul, eds., 1996) and Arti Rai & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
289 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 139. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 137, at 7 (“[T]he domain of accessible 
knowledge benefits from the upswing in issuances. Since the other side of the patent coin is 
disclosure, more patents mean more information is revealed in the specifications, with the result 
that more information is available for immediate use.”). Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss recognize that 
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Dreyfuss are not alone in considering the domain of accessible 
knowledge as a public domain.140 
L. PD 12: The Unpublished Public Domain 
The public domain conceptions considered thus far have 
assumed, even if sometimes implicitly, that the contents of the public 
domain are “public” in the sense that they are publicly accessible. 
Professor Tony Reese has discovered the existence of a public 
domain of unpublished works.141 He has identified three categories of 
unpublished works created prior to 1933 that entered an IP-free 
public domain on January 1, 2003, as a matter of U.S. copyright law: 
(1) private works, such as journals, (2) preparatory works, such as 
first drafts of novels, and (3) publicly displayed or performed works, 
such as radio broadcasts.142 Although television programs may be 
viewed by millions of people, U.S. copyright law does not consider 
them to be “published” because copies of them have not been 
distributed to the public.143 Reese suggests that “[a]dding to the public 
domain works that have been kept private may change the legal 
regulation of the public domain.”144 Perhaps even more significant is 
 
if the increase in patenting of scientific innovations is occurring because of inappropriately low 
standards of invention, then patents on “trivial variations and marginal improvements 
essentially withdraw[] from the public domain information that, effectively, was already there: 
either it was described in the literature, or was so easily grasped, the patent system was not 
needed to encourage the advance.” Id. at 12. 
 140. Australian scholars Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman also consider the domain of 
accessible information as a public domain. They distinguish among: (1) that which is secret, (2) 
that which is public domain and unencumbered by intellectual property rights, and (3) that 
which is public domain but encumbered by intellectual property rights. Sherman & Wiseman, 
supra note 21 (manuscript at 10). Yet, Sherman and Wiseman also use “public domain” to 
denote IP-free information artifacts and resources, as in Public Domains Number 1 and 2. Id. at 
(manuscript at 1–2). 
 141. See R. Anthony Reese, The New Unpublished Public Domain 2 (Aug. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (“[T]he nature of the public domain has been 
significantly changed, by including for the first time a substantial body of material that is legally 
unprotected by copyright but that has never been publicly disclosed.”). This unpublished public 
domain might be viewed as a subset of PD 1 (IP-free information artifacts), but it has not 
previously been recognized as such. Because Reese claims that this public domain changes the 
nature of the public domain, see infra note 145 and accompanying text, it is better to recognize it 
as its own public domain. 
 142. Reese, supra note 141, at 1. 
 143. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “publication”). 
 144. Reese, supra note 141, at 1. One reason that legal regulation of the public domain 
might change is that possessors of unpublished works may raise state law claims to protect the 
works against unauthorized uses, raising as yet unanswered preemption and Supremacy Clause 
issues. Reese discusses these issues. Id. at 26–31. 
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the change it creates in “the nature of the public domain by . . . 
ending copyright’s legal restrictions on works that have not been 
publicly disclosed.”145 
Although the legislative history of the law that created this new 
public domain is sparse, the unpublished public domain was a 
byproduct of abolishing state common law protection for unpublished 
works, hitherto conceived as perpetual in duration.146 After the 
effective date of this law, original works, whether published or 
unpublished, were granted copyright protection for the life of the 
author plus fifty years.147 To induce publication of unpublished works, 
Congress gave their authors twenty-five years of exclusive rights if the 
“life plus” term had either expired or nearly so.148 On January 1, 2003, 
that twenty-five-year term expired, and consequently, all unpublished 
works created before 1933 entered an unpublished public domain on 
that day.149 Each January since then, a new wave of unpublished 
works enters this unpublished public domain. 
Some possessors of such unpublished works may want to make 
them widely available without restriction,150 but others may decide to 
exercise personal property rights in artifacts embodying these works 
to assert legal control over uses that can be made of their contents.151 
Professor Reese concludes that possessors of such works probably 
can contractually restrict access to and uses that can be made of these 
 
 145. Id. at 48. Reese points out that 
the traditional phrase “public domain” simultaneously reflected two different senses 
of the word “public.” The public domain was not “private” in two ways. First, works 
in the public domain were not the private property of any individual; they were 
instead common and open to the public for use without restriction. Second, works in 
the public domain were not private in the sense of being shielded from public view or 
held in confidence; instead, virtually every work in the public domain had been made 
available to the public. 
 Id. at 21 (citation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 3. 
 147. 17 U.S.C. §. 302(a) (2000). The “plus” term was extended to 70 years by the Sonny 
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 
(1998). Section 302 also provides duration rules for joint works, works for hire, and anonymous 
works. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (b)–(c). 
 148. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). 
 149. Reese says that “[t]his was probably the largest single deposit of material into the 
public domain in history.” Reese, supra note 141, at 1. 
 150. Public libraries and archives may be eager to share unpublished works with the public 
because they may perceive their missions to be to promote wide public access to information. 
 151. Museums, for example, often condition public access to their collections on agreements 
not to take pictures or to take pictures only for noncommercial purposes. Reese, supra note 141, 
at 29. 
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works, notwithstanding the IP-free legal status of the information 
embodied in them and of the information artifacts themselves.152 
M. PD 13: The Romantic (or Imperialist) Public Domain 
Professor Reese’s is not the only unconventional public domain 
in the literature. Critics of Western-style public domain concepts (in 
the sense of IP-free information resources) express concern about the 
implications of these concepts for indigenous people who want some 
legal protection for commercially valuable traditional knowledge.153 
Insofar as traditional knowledge is secret or is disclosed in 
confidence, indigenous people can enforce their rights in traditional 
knowledge because Western-style intellectual property regimes 
protect secrets from misappropriation through trade secret and 
breach of confidence laws.154 When Western firms acquire nonsecret 
traditional knowledge, however, they feel justified in appropriating 
the knowledge without compensating the indigenous communities 
from which it comes because they believe it to be in an IP-free public 
domain.155 Western public domain concepts are often at odds with 
customary norms of indigenous cultures that regulate appropriate and 
inappropriate uses of accessible traditional knowledge. The IP-free 
 
 152. See id. at 31 (“[A]rchival conditional access contracts may in many instances be quite 
practically effective . . . .”). Reese also considers whether Congress should adopt an exclusive 
right of first publication to induce publication of unpublished public domain works and 
concludes it should not. Id. at 31–48. However, Congress might choose to grant such a right to 
conform to a similar right in EU law. See Council Directive 93/98, art. 4, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 
(establishing a term of protection for previously unpublished works first published after 
copyright protection has expired). If Congress does decide to grant a new exclusive right to 
possessors of unpublished works, Reese believes that the right should be carefully 
circumscribed. Reese, supra note 141, at 46–48. He recommends, for instance, that the right not 
be automatically granted, but only made available to those who affirmatively register their claim 
and deposit copies of the works. Registration, and other limitations Reese proposes, would 
reduce transactions costs that would otherwise be imposed by such a new exclusive right. Id. at 
46–47. 
 153. See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335 (“Native people once stood for the 
commons. But in the advent of an awareness of the valuable genetic and knowledge resources 
within native communities and lesser developed nations, the advocates for the public domain—
and, in turn, propertization—have flipped.”); Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript 
at 6) (“Many of the problems associated with the general expansion of intellectual property 
rights have also been raised in relation to the use of intellectual property rights to protect 
Indigenous creations.”). 
 154. Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4, 11–12). 
 155. For examples, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–28 (1996). 
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public domain can seem to members of indigenous cultures and their 
sympathizers like yet another tool of Western imperialism.156 
Professors Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman, who have 
studied Australian aboriginal traditional knowledge policy, observe: 
Given the differences that exist between the Indigenous aesthetic 
and that which underpins Western intellectual property law, and the 
ways in which public domain ideals have been used as tools of 
exploitation and colonisation, it is not surprising that Indigenous 
groups have been critical of the public domain and the application of 
intellectual property to Indigenous creations. . . . If we are to take 
Indigenous issues seriously it is clear that we need to reject 
proposals that simply attempt to balance private and public 
interests. . . . More specifically, it is necessary to reconfigure the 
public domain so that it supports and fosters, rather than 
undermines, Indigenous interests. That is, it is necessary to create 
and recognise the domains established under customary or 
indigenous law as new spaces within the legal landscape, rather than 
merely applying spatial configurations developed in other contexts 
to Indigenous creations.157 
Professors Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also take 
seriously concerns of indigenous cultures about appropriation of 
traditional knowledge. They have criticized public domain advocates 
for having a romantic view of the public domain. This romantic view 
causes these advocates to resist “each and every new claim for 
property rights as an encroachment on the public domain,”158 and in 
 
 156. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335 (“[F]or centuries the public domain has 
been a source for exploiting the labor and bodies of the disempowered—namely, people of 
color, the poor, women, and people from the global South.”). 
 157. Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13–14) (citations omitted). 
Sherman and Wiseman propose to reconcile these tensions by protecting traditional knowledge 
through legal rules akin to those that protect geographic designations of origin (e.g., Roquefort 
for blue cheese, Sancerre for wine). Id. (manuscript at 17–18). Uses of traditional knowledge 
that falsely imply derivation from a particular indigenous culture, for example, could be 
regulated without undermining Western-style IP-free public domain concepts. Other scholars 
propose protecting traditional knowledge through liability rules. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & 
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF 
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 136, at 
337, 338 (“Our thesis is that a properly designed liability rule to protect small-scale innovation 
in developing countries would overcome investors’ fears of market failure with fewer social 
costs than would accrue either under a regime of unbridled copying or under a regime of hybrid 
exclusive property rights . . . .”). 
 158. Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335. 
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so doing, they “join hands with the corporations to keep traditional 
knowledge and genetic resource [sic] in the global commons.”159 This 
may “(1) legitimate the current distribution of intellectual property 
rights, (2) mask how current constructions of the public domain 
disadvantage and subordinate indigenous and other disempowered 
groups globally, and (3) impair efforts by disempowered groups to 
claim themselves as subjects of property . . . .”160 Although 
sympathetic with the goals of public domain advocates, Chander and 
Sunder recommend that these advocates adopt a more nuanced and 
cautious stance toward the public domain and recognize the justice of 
claims of indigenous peoples as to Western appropriation of 
traditional knowledge and plant genetic resources.161 Their romantic 
public domain is, thus, a reaction to and pushback against several of 
the public domains previously discussed. 
II.  WHY SO MANY PUBLIC DOMAINS AND  
WHAT DO THEY HAVE IN COMMON? 
Professor Boyle’s Second Enclosure article recognizes four public 
domains.162 Four is a relatively manageable number of public domains 
to keep straight. Even Boyle, however, might find it daunting to keep 
track of thirteen public domains.163 In the spirit of facilitating nuanced 
discourse about the multiplicity of public domains, this Part will 
consider why public domains have proliferated and then suggest some 
commonalities among them. The commonalities allow some 
clustering of public domains to make discourse about and among the 
many public domains more manageable. 
 
 159. Id. at 1336. 
 160. Id. at 1335. 
 161. See id. at 1334 (“We are sympathetic to the project to protect the public domain . . . 
[b]ut we are also concerned that the increasingly binary tenor of current intellectual property 
debates . . . obscures other important interests, options, critiques, and claims for justice . . . .”). 
 162. Boyle, supra note 3, at 59–62. They were, in this Lecture’s terminology, PD 1 (IP-free 
information artifacts), 2 (IP-free information resources), 5 (broadly usable information 
resources), and 6 (contractually constructed commons). 
 163. For five other public domains that could have been, but were not, discussed in this 
Lecture, see supra note 22. 
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A. Explanations for Proliferation of Public Domains 
Professor Boyle suggests that fear has contributed to the growth 
in public domains;164 that is, some definitions reflect what scholars 
articulating them fear might happen to undermine a socially valuable 
realm of freely usable information resources. There is certainly some 
truth in this observation. Professor Lange was initially motivated to 
recognize an IP-free public domain because he feared that publicity 
and dilution rights were encroaching on a public domain of 
information resources that, as a creator, he valued for its availability 
for free appropriation.165 Boyle fears a second enclosure movement in 
which stronger intellectual property rights, buttressed by such things 
as technical protections and restrictive licensing rules, will choke off, 
rather than promote, innovation and other socially valuable uses of 
information.166 The science commons proposed by Professor 
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir is a response to their fears that increasing 
propertization of scientific work will undermine scientific progress.167 
Although their concerns run in the opposite direction, Professors 
Chander and Sunder similarly seem to have defined their romantic 
public domain because of fears that unreflective public domain 
advocacy may undermine the distributive justice claims of indigenous 
peoples arising from Western exploitations of their cultural 
resources.168 
Some differences in public domain definitions are, however, due 
to different conceptual groundings, purposes that authors have in 
putting the definitions forward, and audiences being addressed. If one 
grounds one’s conception of a public domain in the U.S. Constitution, 
as Professors Zimmerman and Birnhack do,169 the result will be 
different than if a public domain is grounded in principles of justice 
towards indigenous peoples. Grounding a public domain in positive 
 
 164. Boyle, supra note 2, at 29. 
 165. Lange, supra note 109, at 469–70. 
 166. See Boyle, supra note 3, at 44 (“More property rights, even though they supposedly 
offer greater incentive, do not necessarily make for more and better productions and 
innovation—sometimes just the opposite is true.”); see also James Boyle, A Politics of 
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 98–99 (1997) (“The ironic 
result is that a regime which lauds and proposes to encourage the great creator, may in that 
process actually take away the raw materials which future creators need to produce their little 
piece of innovation.”). 
 167. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 53–56, 125–28 and accompanying text. 
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law will, in contrast, tend to produce a definition focused on the 
absence of intellectual property rights.170 
Conceptual groundings, purposes, and audiences are sometimes 
interrelated. For instance, Professors Zimmerman and Birnhack 
aspire to construct a constitutional fence around their public domains 
that Congress and courts cannot breach. Their intended audience is 
principally other scholars and courts. If they can convince other 
scholars to agree on a constitutional public domain, this may 
influence the courts to follow a scholarly consensus favoring 
protection of this domain. Professor Benkler and Professor David 
Bollier use the term public domain more generally to denote 
freedoms to use information resources in an effort to galvanize 
popular awareness of free speech values served by the public domain. 
Their main purpose is to encourage a new and more public-regarding 
politics of intellectual property. 
Other conceptions of public domains seem to have been born out 
of dissatisfaction with the “traditional, absolutist conception of the 
public domain” (that is, information resources unencumbered by 
intellectual property rights).171 IP-free definitions of public domain 
seem too dull, too tired, too old, too isolated, and too passive to 
express the positive values of the public domain that scholars who 
have been studying it perceive it to have. When commentators use 
public domain and “the commons” interchangeably or use the latter 
to signify the former, it may be because “the commons” seems more 
interesting, more wired, newer, more communal, and more dynamic 
than the IP-free public domain. 
Professor Lange’s conception of public domain as a status 
presumptively empowering creators to appropriate from the works of 
others, for example, is designed to give the public domain a more 
dynamic and affirmative character. Professor Cohen articulates a 
sociology of the creative process as a way to give vitality to her 
conception of a public domain situated as a resource to draw from in 
a situated cultural landscape.172 Cohen objects to the term public 
domain because it is not, as the term implies, a place separate and 
 
 170. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 16, at 137 (“Is the public domain simply whatever is left 
over after various tests of legal protection have been applied? Is it mere ‘background,’ the 
‘negative’ of whatever may be protected?”). 
 171. Boyle, supra note 3, at 61. 
 172. Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19–41). 
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apart from the realm of IP-protected content.173 Rather, the public 
domain is an integral part of the cultural landscape, from which 
everyone should be able to draw. 
Professor Cohen would probably prefer to coin an alternative 
term, for she considers public domain to be metaphorically burdened 
by the original American usage that valorizes private appropriation of 
the public domain of unsettled lands.174 Yet, because the term has 
become a standard metaphor to describe IP-free information 
resources, Cohen strives instead to broaden and breathe new life into 
this concept. Professor Edward Lee, in contrast, draws upon positive 
conceptions of public domain from legal contexts other than IP law, 
and suggests that these positive conceptions have resonance for the IP 
debate about the public domain. 
Finally, public domain concepts may have proliferated in recent 
years because “the public domain,” as such, does not really exist. It is 
a metaphor, a social-legal construct, that serves “an instrumental 
purpose—to assist us in thinking of a complex issue, to organize our 
thoughts, to serve as a ‘short cut’ to denote a mindset, a view, a 
perception”175 about the legal status of different types of information 
and what can be done with this information. 
B. Clustering Multiple Public Domains 
Though each definition of public domain was separately 
articulated in Part I, there is obvious overlap among definitions. The 
definitions cluster around three main foci: the legal status of 
information resources, freedoms to use information resources, and 
the accessibility of information resources. 
Legal status definitions consider whether information resources 
are or can be encumbered by intellectual property rights. PD 1 (IP-
free information artifacts), 2 (IP-free information resources), and 12 
(the unpublished public domain) are three examples of this focus. PD 
3 (the constitutional or mandatory public domain), in essence, revisits 
PD 2 with an eye to carving out what, as a matter of U.S. 
 
 173. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
 174. Id. (manuscript at 52). 
 175. E-mail from Michael Birnhack, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, to 
Pamela Samuelson, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Information Management, University of 
California at Berkeley (Oct. 28, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally 
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (discussing how 
metaphors shape how humans think about the phenomenon they perceive). 
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constitutional law, must be there and stay there. PD 4 (the 
privatizable public domain) was born of the recognition that PD 3 is 
not coextensive with the public domain of IP-free information 
resources. The privatizable public domain needed to be recognized 
because PD 2 encompasses more than PD 3, and PD 4 is the realm of 
PD 2 that lies outside of PD 3. If Professor Reese, the discoverer of 
PD 12, is correct that the unpublished public domain can 
constitutionally be privatized,176 the unpublished public domain would 
itself be a subset of the privatizable public domain (i.e., PD 4). 
Six public domains focus on freedoms to use information 
resources even when works embodying these resources are protected 
by intellectual property rights. PD 5 (broadly usable information 
resources) is the clearest example. This public domain encompasses 
the whole of PD 2 (IP-free information resources), but also includes 
unregulated, implicitly licensed, unambiguously fair, and otherwise 
privileged uses of IP-protected information resources. PD 5 builds on 
the insight that ordinary persons do not care if an information 
resource is IP-protected as long as they can freely use the resource. 
Richard Stallman and Professor Lawrence Lessig invoke 
freedom as the principal rationale for creating the contractually 
constructed commons of GPL and Creative Commons licenses (PD 
6).177 These licenses provide greater freedoms to use information 
resources than default IP rules and common proprietary licensing 
practices generally permit,178 although GPL and CC-licensed content 
are certainly less free than IP-free information resources. These 
licenses have been conceived by some as a “partial dedication” of 
information resources to the public domain.179 
Professors Lange and Cohen seek to promote freedoms for 
artists, authors, and other creators. Their public domains (PD 7 and 
 
 176. Reese, supra note 138, at 33–39. 
 177. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, at xiv (2004) (“[T]he 
free culture that I defend in this book is a balance between anarchy and control.”); Richard 
Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, Free Software Foundation (FSF) (2005), http://www.gnu.org/ 
gnu/manifesto.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (“Software sellers want to divide the users and 
conquer them . . . . I refuse to break solidarity with other users in this way.”). 
 178. The GPL, for instance, requires publication of source code and allows modification of 
program code, whereas proprietary software is generally distributed without source code and 
licenses forbid modification. Free Software Foundation, Licenses, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/ 
licenses/index_html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006). 
 179. Merges, supra note 75, at 199 (emphasis omitted). 
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8) would, respectively, grant artists a status presumptively entitling 
them to appropriate from others’ works and provide a cultural 
landscape from which creators would be free to draw whatever 
inspired them to engage in artistic self-expression.180 Although Cohen 
and Lange express their visions of public domain quite differently, 
there is a deep similarity in their visions. 
Professor Birnhack’s communicative sphere public domain (PD 
9) imagines freedom to engage and be engaged with information 
resources as a core constitutional principle. This sphere would, I 
believe, encompass the Cohen and Lange artistic creation public 
domains, as well as Professor Benkler’s public domain of broad 
uses.181 Birnhack’s communicative sphere conception would probably 
also encompass Professor Lee’s public domain of publicly disclosed 
government information (PD 10) which, at its core, is also a public 
domain concerned with freedom to use information to promote 
democratic discourse and governance.182 
A key distinguishing feature of Professor Lee’s public domain 
(PD 10) is the attention he gives to the importance of accessibility of 
information.183 When a journalist obtains a copy of a secret 
government document that, say, casts doubt on the veracity of 
statements of government officials, and disseminates information 
from that document to the public in a newspaper, the journalist 
dedicates that information to a public domain that will fuel 
democratic discourse.184 The legal status of the document and 
information embedded in it will depend not on intellectual property 
laws, but on laws such as those that protect classified information and 
other government secrets from disclosure.185 The journalist may face 
legal liability for disclosing information of concern to the government, 
 
 180. See supra notes 103–23 and accompanying text. 
 181. Professors Chander and Sunder’s romantic public domain (PD 13) is the most difficult 
to fit into the clusters discussed in this Section. In a sense, these scholars are concerned with 
freedom too, albeit in a different way than those whose public domains are defined in terms of 
freedoms that they do or should provide to creators or members of the general public. Chander 
and Sunder are concerned that these public domain advocates may make this domain too free 
for commercial appropriation by Western firms. 
 182. Birnhack does not, however, mention Lee’s public domain. 
 183. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Lee, supra note 19, at 136–37 (“[T]he concept of the public domain helps to 
establish a lethal restraint against government overreaching by ensuring the public’s access to 
materials that are essential for self-governance and a learned citizenry.”). 
 185. U.S. government works are ineligible for copyright protection in the U.S. under 17 
U.S.C. § 105 (2000). 
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but the information itself, once published, is irretrievably part of a 
public domain of information resources such as PD 2.186 
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss also emphasize the 
accessibility of information, although their concern is with the 
accessibility of scientific information instead of government 
information.187 Their public domain (PD 11) is a zone in which 
information may be encumbered by intellectual property rights, but is 
disclosed to the public as a condition of obtaining these rights. 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss point out that if researchers cannot obtain 
intellectual property rights on research results, they may well keep 
the results secret. Patenting may disclose important details about the 
discovery, how it differs from the prior art, and how to make it. This 
information will immediately enter the IP-free PD 2, although certain 
uses of the information will need to be licensed until the patent 
expires. If society has to choose between public accessibility through 
patents and inaccessibility without patents, the former would be the 
more prudent choice because accessible information is more likely to 
advance the state of knowledge in fields of science than inaccessible 
information. 
Professor Reese’s unpublished public domain (PD 12) focuses on 
the legal status of unpublished works created before the mid-1930s, 
but accessibility is very much at the heart of Reese’s concerns about 
this domain.188 Hence, his public domain also belongs in the 
accessibility cluster. Reese implicitly asks what it means for an 
information artifact to be in a copyright-free public domain if it is not 
publicly accessible. If possessors of information artifacts have 
personal property rights that include the right to control all access to 
and uses of the information artifact and any information it may 
contain, the public does not really derive any benefit from the 
existence of an unpublished public domain. Physical control over the 
artifact embodying IP-free information may, if Reese is right, convey 
more power to control uses than IP laws would provide.189 
 
 186. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 188. See supra notes 141–52 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Reese, supra note 141, at 24–25 (“While copyright might permit anyone to make 
and distribute copies of an old unpublished work, no one can engage in those activities without 
having access to the work . . . .”). 
02__SAMUELSON.DOC 8/21/2006  8:42 AM 
820 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:783 
C. Lessons Learned 
Several lessons emerge from clustering these public domains. 
First, although the legal status of information resources and public 
accessibility are, in a sense, orthogonal dimensions, the most robust 
public domains are those which are free (or relatively so) of IP 
encumbrances while at the same time being broadly accessible to 
members of the public. Figure 1 depicts a matrix that clusters public 
domains by legal status and accessibility.190 
Figure 1.  IP Status and Accessibility Matrix 
 Encumbered by IPRs? 
Publicly 
Accessible? Yes No 
Yes PD 5, 6, 9, 11  
(broad use; contractual 
commons; communal sphere; 
zone of accessible 
information) 
PD 1, 2, 3, 4, 10  
(4 kinds of IP-free PD + 
disclosed government 
information) 
No Not in the public domain  
(e.g., private letters in 
copyright) 
PD 12  
(unpublished public domain) 
 
From the standpoint of public domain advocates, the optimal sector 
for information resources is the sector that is both unencumbered by 
IPR constraints and publicly accessible (the upper-right quadrant). 
These information resources are freely reusable for all purposes. The 
second-best quadrant is the upper-left quadrant, where information 
resources are encumbered by IPRs, but accessible and broadly usable 
for many, although not all, purposes. The quadrant of inaccessible 
information unencumbered by IPRs may provide some public benefit 
as compared with the quadrant of inaccessible encumbered 
information insofar as the IP-free legal status removes an impediment 
to publication for possessors of some such information. 
A second lesson is that although it may be common to conceive 
of information as either being in an IP-free public domain or 
encumbered by IP rights, the public domain literature reveals a 
 
 190. Some public domain concepts, such as Professor Cohen’s cultural landscape and 
Professors Chander and Sunder’s romantic public domain, cannot be depicted in this matrix, but 
most can be. 
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continuum of legal states in between those endpoints. Figure 2 depicts 
this spectrum: 
Figure 2.  Legal-Status Spectrum 
Most Restrictive Least Restrictive
IPRs+ 
K+ 
TPM 
IPRs+ 
K 
IPRs  
(but fair use)
GPL/
open 
source
CC 
license 
Implicit 
license 
(WWW) 
IP-free 
public 
domain 
Constitutional 
public domain
 
The left end of the spectrum in Figure 2 shows that intellectual 
property rights are not the most restrictive form of information 
regulation. Licenses (represented as K for contract) may limit uses 
that would otherwise be unregulated or privileged by IP laws.191 
Technical protection measures (TPM) may further restrict uses and 
be backed up legally by anticircumvention rules.192 Because this triple 
protection may be more restrictive than IPRs alone, the triple 
protection seems to belong at the far end of the legal-status spectrum. 
IPR-protected works are more public domain friendly than works 
that are protected by contract and technology, as well as IPRs, 
because of the unprotectability of ideas and information, fair use, and 
other privileged and unregulated uses. 
The GPL and open source licenses allow a far broader range of 
uses than most proprietary software licenses, yet they are, as 
compared with wholly free IP-information resources, much more 
restrictive.193 Because CC licenses contain fewer constraints, on 
 
 191. See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 17, 23 (1999) (“[The delicate] balance [of copyright law] is disrupted when state [contract] 
law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the expense of copyright 
users.”). 
 192. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). See Symposium, 
The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 487 (2003) 
(“The idea of building copy restrictions into software and hardware has emerged as a common 
response to . . . unauthorized copying . . . . What has varied is the extent to which changes in the 
law, sometimes as drastic as technological mandates, prescribed and protected such 
technological controls.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a 
Worthy Pursuit, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 3. 
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average, than GPL or open source licenses, Figure 2 places CC 
license toward the less restricted end of the spectrum. Of course, 
some CC licenses are more restrictive than others (e.g., some allow 
noncommercial uses but not derivative works, whereas others permit 
the making of derivatives).194 Thus, CC licenses are not really a single 
point on the legal status spectrum, but rather are themselves a 
minispectrum of license options. 
Less restrictive than CC-licensed content is information posted 
on open sites on the World Wide Web that is, at least implicitly, 
licensed for most uses. Even at the IP-free end of the spectrum, the 
legal status of an information resource may still be differentiated. 
Some information resources are more likely than others to be 
constitutionally protected from privatization. 
Public domain scholars draw the line for their public domain 
somewhere on this spectrum between the triply encumbered 
information resources and the constitutional public domain. For 
many scholars, the public domain is at the IP-free endpoint(s) of the 
spectrum,195 whereas for others, the public domain lies more in the 
middle of the spectrum.196 
Accessibility, too, is not a bipolar concept, but a relative concept 
that can also be depicted as a spectrum ranging between the 
endpoints of complete public accessibility and complete 
inaccessibility. Figure 3 shows this spectrum. 
Figure 3.  Accessibility Spectrum 
Complete inaccessibility  Complete accessibility
Buried 
(none can 
see) 
Secret  
(few can 
see) 
Archived 
with 
restricted 
access  
(or secret 
licensed) 
Publicly 
displayed 
but not 
“published”
In public 
record, but 
difficult to 
access 
Publicly 
accessible 
if register 
Publicly 
accessible 
without 
restriction 
 
 194. Creative Commons, Choosing a License, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2006). 
 195. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 1, at 217–22 (discussing what is unprotected by IP and thus 
in the public domain); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 297 (“In the standard lexicon of 
intellectual property law, communicative matter is divided into two parts: that which is 
controlled by a private ‘owner’ and that which resides in the public domain . . . .”). 
 196. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 75, at 362 (assuming that the public domain is a range); 
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 324–25 (advocating construction of a public domain 
outside of IP law through the use of contract law). 
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The most inaccessible information is that which has been destroyed or 
buried without anyone presently knowing of its existence (although 
buried information is occasionally uncovered). Next most inaccessible 
is an information resource stored in a vault or otherwise maintained 
as a closely guarded secret. Many secrets are, of course, licensed or 
otherwise distributed to one or more persons subject to implicit or 
explicit confidentiality restrictions.197 Licenses vary in restrictiveness 
regarding who may access and use the information and for what 
purposes. Licensed information is, thus, a minispectrum within the 
larger accessibility spectrum, not just one point on the spectrum. 
Licensed information may be part of the unpublished public 
domain, but this latter domain also includes much content, such as 
television and radio programming and paintings mounted on the walls 
of public museums.198 Because publicly displayed information is much 
more accessible than licensed secrets or information kept in vaults, it 
is depicted in Figure 3 as lying toward the more accessible end of the 
spectrum. A considerable amount of information is publicly 
accessible (e.g., court records) if one is willing to take time and effort 
to discover it, but is, pragmatically speaking, not as accessible as 
information available online for which one registers to get access 
(e.g., the online version of the New York Times). Figure 3 
accommodates these insights by putting such information near, but 
not overlapping with, information that is publicly accessible without 
restriction on this spectrum. The public/private distinction, as applied 
to accessibility of information, is thus more nuanced and complicated 
than common discourse about it might suggest. 
III.  BENEFITS AND RISKS OF  
ACCEPTING MULTIPLE PUBLIC DOMAINS 
Accepting the existence of multiple public domains offers several 
benefits. For one thing, it avoids unnecessary and likely fruitless 
disputes over which definition of the public domain is the “true” or 
“correct” one.199 A second benefit is broadened awareness about 
 
 197. See, e.g., JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRET LAW § 9.04[2] (1997) (reviewing the 
increasingly common employee confidentiality agreement). 
 198. Reese, supra note 141, at 12. 
 199. Accepting multiple public domains also avoids wasteful expenditures of time and 
energy by scholars in reconsidering and recasting previous analyses of public domain issues to 
take into account a later-arising consensus definition (assuming consensus could be achieved). 
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public domains and public domain values. When scholars, such as 
Professors Benkler, Birnhack, Boyle, and Lessig, speak about a wide 
range of free uses of information resources as a public domain that 
members of the public should be able to enjoy, they speak in a 
language accessible to the public, appealing to shared values of the 
American free speech culture. An intellectual property professional, 
although willing to agree that certain uses of information resources 
are beyond copyright owner control, might offer pedantic 
explanations for this conclusion.200 Members of the public are likely to 
tune out to such explanations because they lack moral force.201 
A third benefit of accepting multiple public domains is that 
context-sensitive uses can develop. One differentiator may be who is 
speaking. When Professor Benkler speaks of a public domain, he will 
mean a broader realm of information resources than Professor 
Zimmerman, for example.202 Another differentiator may be the 
affected communities. The public domain concerns and needs of 
artistic communities may, for example, be different from the concerns 
and needs of scientific communities. Artists need freedom to engage 
 
Moreover, even if scholars were willing to retract their previous definitions to accommodate 
consensus on a different public domain definition, their prior work utilizing the old definition 
would still be in the literature and could still influence the views of subsequent scholars ignorant 
of the retraction. So at least in the short, and possibly medium, term, a consensus definition 
seems neither feasible nor likely to dispel future confusion. 
 200. A copyright lawyer might explain, for example, that it is permissible to copy ideas or 
information from a copyrighted work because section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 
excludes them from the scope of copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (listing 
various elements of works that are not within the scope of copyright protection). It is also 
permissible to parody a copyrighted work under copyright law’s fair use doctrine, Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994), although not necessarily to satirize it, id. at 
580–81. An IP pedant would be clear that fair use and public domain are very different, both 
conceptually and legally. 
An IP pedant might go on to say that of course no one has a “right” to engage in parody, 
for fair use is merely an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement. Whether fair use is a 
defense or a right is the subject of much debate. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 133 & n.20 
(2000) (noting the existence of a controversy over the “defense” and “right” conceptions of fair 
use). 
 201. Copyright professionals may wonder why the public doesn’t respect and abide by 
copyright law as much and as well as copyright owners think it should. Perhaps copyright 
professionals should reflect upon the arcane and nit-picking language that copyright law and its 
statutory categorization provides them. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29, 181 
(2001) (expressing concern about the incomprehensibility of copyright law). 
 202. Compare supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (reflecting a “range” conception of 
the public domain), with supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (reflecting an all-or-nothing 
conception of the public domain). 
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in artistic self-expression, whereas scientists need open access to and 
unconstrained reuse of scientific data, methods, analyses, and 
results.203 A third differentiator may be the kind of information 
resource about which one is speaking. Some public domain resources, 
such as ideas, are more likely to qualify as constitutionally protected 
public domain information resources than, say, boat hulls or typeface 
designs.204 Distinguishing the constitutionally protected public domain 
from the privatizable public domain may clarify debate and analysis. 
A fourth benefit of accepting multiple conceptions of the public 
domain is that it enables more nuanced answers to some questions 
posed in the literature. Is the public domain shrinking, as some 
commentators fear?205 If one views the public domain, as Professor 
Lange once did, as a kind of zero sum game, every expansion of IPRs 
concomitantly shrinks the public domain.206 If one accepts ideas and 
information as public domain resources,207 then publication of new 
copyrighted works will concomitantly expand the public domain and 
the copyright domain, for the ideas and information in these works 
will be dedicated to an IP-free public domain upon publication.208 
 
 203. Compare Cohen, supra note 1, at 58 (“If one asks where the common in artistic culture 
may be found, the answer, quite simply, is that it is everywhere the public is, and that 
unplanned, fortuitous access and opportunistic borrowing are matters of the utmost 
importance.”), with Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 317 (“Factual data are fundamental to 
the progress of science and to our pre-eminent system of innovation.”). 
 204. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text (discussing a constitutional public 
domain); see also supra notes 57–74 and accompanying text (discussing a not-yet-privatized 
public domain). 
 205. Professor Lange once analogized the public domain to the decline of buffalo herds on 
the Western plains, supra note 1, at 178, although he later regretted this metaphor, supra note 
109, at 468. For a recent work using this metaphor, see, for example, Cecil C. Kuhne III, The 
Steadily Shrinking Public Domain: Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern 
Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549 (2004); see also Duke Law School, Conference on the 
Public Domain: Schedule, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/schedule.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006) 
(describing a Saturday morning panel discussion on challenges to science posed by a shrinking 
public domain); Posting of Ann Okerson to http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/ListArchives/ 
0208/msg00074.html (Aug. 20, 2002, 08:11 EST) (disseminating an invitation to a workshop on 
the shrinking public domain). 
 206. See Lange, supra note 1, at 171 (“[T]he very momentum of these expanding claims 
tends to blur, and then displace, important individual and collective rights in the public 
domain.”); id. at 175–76 (“[T]he public domain in the field of intellectual property today can be 
compared to the public grazing lands on the Western plains of a century ago.”). 
 207. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) (“The copyright of a work on 
mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation 
which he propounds . . . .”). 
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Similarly, if one asks whether the public domain is the same as 
the commons, the answer will depend on the context in which the 
terms are used. Professor Litman used public domain and commons 
interchangeably to signify that certain information resources can be 
used without IP or other restrictions and hence are common 
resources to all for all purposes.209 But neither Professor Litman nor 
other public domain scholars would be confused when Professor 
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir use the term “commons” in relation to 
scientific databases.210 Public domain scholars would also accept that 
the science commons would require elaborate institutional regulation 
of IPR-protected information resources in order to promote public 
domain values.211 
A fifth, and probably the most significant, benefit of accepting 
multiple public domains is that one gains deeper insights about public 
domain values by looking at public domains from different 
perspectives. Distilling insights from the broad-ranging public domain 
scholarship, one can discern that the public domain serves many 
positive functions for society: as a building block for the creation of 
new knowledge,212 and as an enabler of competitive imitation,213 
follow-on creation,214 free or low cost access to information,215 public 
 
 209. Litman, supra note 1, at 975 (“In the intellectual property context, the term [public 
domain] describes a true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are 
ineligible for private ownership. The contents of the public domain may be mined by any 
member of the public.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 210. E.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 462 . 
 211. See, e.g., id. at 326–29 (reviewing the key role of the United States government in 
maintaining the research commons). The “commons” of Creative Commons is distinguishable 
from Professor Litman’s and Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir’s commons because this 
organization provides a legal infrastructure for enabling individual creators to make their works 
available for broad usages, while allowing them to retain control over some uses of their works. 
See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 317 (“Factual data are fundamental to 
the progress of science and to our preeminent system of innovation.”). 
 213. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 1, at 215 (“We take it for granted that the plays of 
Shakespeare and the symphonies of Beethoven are in the public domain and may be freely 
copied, adapted, and performed by anyone.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 1, at 966 (“But the very act of authorship in any medium is 
more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of 
the sea.”). 
 215. See, e.g., Molly S. Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright Law, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1535, 1575 (2005) (“Where the second-generation creator just needs to reuse an abstract 
idea, or a generally-catchy tune, she can probably find what she needs in the public 
domain . . . .”). 
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access to cultural heritage,216 education,217 self-expression and 
autonomy,218 various governmental functions,219 or deliberative 
democracy.220 This recognition, in turn, may foster interdisciplinary 
work to extend understanding of public domains and the values they 
serve. 
Public domain scholarship has also offered an array of inspiring 
ideas about how and why to preserve and protect public domains.221 
Some scholars direct attention to legislative proposals (e.g., advising 
legislators not to enact new legal norms that encroach on the public 
domain, such as EU-style database legislation).222 Some offer legal 
arguments for preserving public domain information resources in 
anticipation of litigation in which the public domain status of those 
resources might be tested (e.g., by setting forth a constitutional 
 
 216. See, e.g., quotation cited supra note 213. 
 217. See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that the public domain “enable[s] all 
sorts of endeavors,” including education); cf. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 215 (“Students and 
scholars debate historical events, ranging from the origins of man to the impeachment of 
President Clinton.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3) (discussing the argument of some 
scholars that “the extension of copyright protection to a variety of materials . . . amount[s] to 
improper appropriation of the public domain building blocks of knowledge and creative 
expression”). 
 219. See, e.g., Patterson & Joyce, supra note 16, at 756 (“Indeed, history demonstrates that 
even individuals who own copyrights on governmental works can perform a censorship function 
for the government . . . .”). 
 220. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 19, at 97 (“[T]he 
concept of the public domain helps to establish a legal restraint against government 
overreaching by ensuring the public’s access to materials that are essential for self-governance 
and a learned citizenry.”); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 332 (“To be sure, some progenitors of 
the First Amendment may have understood the necessity for a public domain to effectuate their 
vision of protection for public discourse . . . .”). 
 221. Although the literature mainly offers positive perspectives about public domains, a 
number of public domain scholars have pointed out that Western-style public domain concepts 
have sometimes had baleful consequences for indigenous people whose folklore, sacred art, and 
shamanic knowledge have been appropriated without compensation. See supra note 21. And if 
one takes seriously the time, money and energy that may be required to provide sustainable 
access to public domain information resources, one can come to appreciate that IP incentives 
may be needed to justify investments in sustainable access. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra 
note 74, at 488–95 (arguing for IP protection in otherwise public domain works to encourage 
investment in their preservation and distribution). But see generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante 
vs. Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (questioning 
Landes and Posner’s analysis and conclusions). 
 222. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 336 (noting that one of the legal rules still 
supporting the fragile data-sharing ethos in science is the fact that the U.S. has not made data 
sets protectable IP assets, as has the E.U.); Samuelson, supra note 6, at 159 (warning that an EU 
style database law would “pose [a] substantial threat[] to the digital public domain”). 
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grounding for information resources that some firms may want to 
privatize).223 Some suggest that the public has an affirmative right to 
the contents of the public domain.224 Some offer suggestions for 
proactive measures to promote public domain values by private 
individuals, communities, or institutions (e.g., Creative Commons 
licenses or the contractually reconstructed commons for scientific 
data).225 Some suggest making it easier to dedicate information 
resources to the public domain (e.g., by standardizing disclaimers or 
waivers of IPRs).226 Some offer support for governmental agency 
actions or policies that promote public domain access to data or 
knowledge (e.g., National Institutes of Health guidelines for data 
sharing).227 
Professor Robert Merges points out that many private actors are 
investing in the creation of public domain information resources as 
essential inputs to the creation and dissemination of complementary 
products or services from which they will be able to recoup research 
and development investments.228 Open source software, CC-licensed 
music, and open-access databases are examples of “a private-ordering 
response to the phenomenon of the ‘anticommons’”229—that is, to a 
phenomenon in which a proliferation of property rights inhibits 
investment in innovation because there are too many rights to be 
cleared.230 Merges provocatively suggests that the public domain has 
become more valuable and dynamic in reaction to the strengthening 
of intellectual property rights.231 
 
 223. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 371 (positing a constitutionally grounded public 
domain from which information cannot be removed once it has entered). 
 224. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 19, at 209 (“Whatever lies in the public’s domain belongs, by 
definition, to the people and is, therefore, off-limits to government control.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 371–95 (arguing for a contractually 
created commons). 
 226. Merges, supra note 75, at 185, 201. 
 227. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 138, at 308–09 (noting that the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) has successfully used its power of persuasion to keep scientific norms of data 
sharing alive, but expressing fear that the NIH will soon need additional legal authority). 
 228. Merges, supra note 75, at 183–84. 
 229. Id. at 186; see also id. at 186–98 (reviewing several examples of these “Property-
Preempting Investments”). Merges speaks of CC licenses as partial dedications to the public 
domain. Id. at 199. 
 230. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (“[A] resource is prone 
to underuse in a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ where multiple owners each have a right to 
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.”). 
 231. Merges, supra note 75, at 184–86. 
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Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss make a significant 
contribution to public domain scholarship by emphasizing the 
importance of accessibility of information resources as a means of 
promoting the ongoing progress of science and useful arts.232 
Innovators who have a choice between trade secrecy and patent 
protection for, say, a chemical discovery will thereby be making a 
choice between inaccessible and accessible information. Subsequent 
researchers may rediscover the same compound or process, and 
competitors may eventually reverse engineer the secret, but the 
issuance of a patent will disclose what that innovation is, how to make 
it, how it differs from the prior art, what its known or likely utility is, 
and in the U.S., the best mode of making it. This knowledge will 
thereby become publicly accessible sooner and with less reduplication 
of effort than the trade secret option would produce. Upon 
publication, the information that the patent provides will be in the 
public domain, although certain uses of it will be proscribed during 
the effective life of the patent. Upon expiration, the right to practice 
the claimed invention will be an IP-free public domain as well.233 
The absence-of-IPR definition of public domain tends to ignore 
that some public domain works may become more publicly accessible 
through proprietary access control and licensing restrictions than if 
they were in a completely IP-free zone. Lexis and Westlaw, for 
example, provide access to state and federal statutes, regulations, and 
judicial opinions, all of which are officially IP-free as a matter of U.S. 
law.234 Such legal information is widely available in law libraries and 
on judicial and other nonprofit websites. It is possible, although time 
consuming, for members of the public to access this IP-free 
information without the aid of these proprietary services. As a 
 
 232. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 233. Public accessibility also matters on the copyright side. Works may theoretically be in 
the public domain because the copyright term has expired. However, unless extant copies of 
these works are publicly accessible, the public domain status of the works is of no practical 
significance. The Paul Klee painting that remains in a wealthy person’s study, the movies that 
remain in MGM’s vault, and the diary of a famous author stored in her son’s attic are as lost to 
the effective public domain as works that were destroyed by fires, natural disasters or wars. See 
Reese, supra note 141, at 24–25 (“While copyright might permit anyone to make and distribute 
copies of an old unpublished work, no one can engage in those activities without having access 
to the work . . . .”). 
 234. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that copyright protection is unavailable for laws); see also Patterson & Joyce, supra 
note 16, at 751–58 (explaining why laws and judicial opinions should not be copyright-
protected). 
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practical matter, however, Lexis and Westlaw make public domain 
legal information more widely available to the community that relies 
on them the most, that is, lawyers, law professors, judges, and their 
support staffs. These services are widely used because they add value 
to raw public domain information (e.g., by providing search 
technologies and remote electronic access so that research can be 
done in one’s office or at home without trekking to a library). Access 
controls and commercial licensing are strategies for recouping the 
expenses of providing these added values. The IP-free status of legal 
information is, interestingly enough, an enabler of value-added 
products and services. 
Equally important as public access to information resources is 
the sustainability of that access. Scholars who emphasize the IP-free 
definition of public domain may assume that the IP-free status of 
information resources will ensure continued public accessibility, but 
this is not necessarily so. Charlotte Hess and Professor Elinor 
Ostrom, along with Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir, focus 
attention on the sustainability of the information commons.235 
Sometimes, these authors point out, it is necessary to develop a 
complex regulatory structure in order to provide appropriate and 
sustainable access to a common pool resource, such as scientific 
data.236 This may involve access controls and licensing restrictions that 
may seem similar in some respects to those of proprietary services 
such as Lexis and Westlaw. A contractually constructed research 
commons can, however, be tailored to serve research communities by 
providing open access to research data and rights to use the data for 
research purposes, while at the same time requiring those who draw 
upon the resource to contribute to it. A research commons can 
prevent proprietary free riding on the common resource.237 
 
 235. Hess & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 112 (“Information that used to be ‘free’ is now 
increasingly being privatized, monitored, encrypted, and restricted.”); Reichman & Uhlir, supra 
note 92, at 461 (“Our investigation reveals that the policy of open access to public research data 
rests on a surprisingly fragile foundation in both the legal and normative sense.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 90, at 462 (suggesting that the scientific 
community must “ward off the threat of undue enclosure” by “develop[ing] a regulatory 
framework to preserve the functions of a research commons”). Professor Benkler is optimistic 
that an IP-free commons will be sustainable. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to 
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User 
Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 579 (2000) (noting that the gloomy predictions of IP pundits 
are not preordained). 
 237. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 419–60. 
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Sustainable access may necessitate more of an institutional 
infrastructure than an IP-free public domain alone may permit. 
The main risk in accepting multiple public domains is that people 
will sometimes be confused about what the term means in particular 
contexts.238 A person who believes that open source software is public 
domain software might decide to make a proprietary derivative of the 
software and then be surprised and dismayed when a lawyer for the 
open source software developer threatens to sue for copyright 
infringement and breach of the open source license. A person who 
believes that certain fair use activities (e.g., place-shifting music) are 
public domain might want to start a business selling place-shifting 
services to the public, only to encounter the threat of a lawsuit by the 
recording industry. Even in the absence of threatened or actual 
litigation, confusion about the meaning of public domain in particular 
contexts is likely, especially if there are thirteen or more definitions to 
keep track of. 
No one, of course, is going to be misled into believing that the 
register of copyrights is advocating the abolition of copyright law 
when she speaks of copyright as entering the public domain.239 In 
context, it is possible to discern that she means that members of the 
public are actually talking about copyright these days (and not with 
the reverence that copyright lawyers and industry executives would 
prefer). More generally, discerning the meaning of public domain 
from contextual signals such as speaker, type of information resource, 
and type of community affected will often be dreary and 
unilluminating work. If people mean different things by the same 
term, they find it difficult to communicate effectively. 
One way to dispel some confusion about the meaning of public 
domain in different contexts is to use adjectives to distinguish among 
them. This Lecture has done this, for example, by describing public 
domain information artifacts or resources as IP-free to distinguish 
them from public domains that encompass IP-protected information 
resources. This Lecture has also used constitutional or mandatory 
public domain to denote information resources that cannot, as a 
matter of constitutional law, be privatized. It has identified a 
privatizable public domain to denote information resources that are 
IP-free for now, but may become IP-encumbered in the future. 
 
 238. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 22. 
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Professors Chander and Sunder similarly use the adjective “romantic” 
to signal their differentiated meaning for public domain. 
In future work, I expect to continue to recognize these five public 
domains (PD 1, 2, 3, 4, and 13) and to distinguish among them with 
adjectives. I do not expect to use the term unpublished public domain 
(unless marked off with quotation marks to indicate Professor 
Reese’s usage) because for me a domain must be public in the sense 
of being publicly accessible to be a public domain. Reese’s domain 
might more appropriately be called an unpublic domain or a domain 
of unpublished works free from copyright restrictions. 
When addressed to a general audience, Professor Benkler’s use 
of public domain to signify a domain of free uses of information 
resources seems sensible. However, in legal discourse, this use of 
public domain obscures more than it illuminates various legal status 
concepts that I believe legal scholars should try to keep distinct. For 
similar reasons, I will not in future work characterize open source or 
CC-licensed content as public domain because I regard contractually 
constructed commons as a more appropriate moniker for this class of 
information resources. Open source and CC-licensed content may, of 
course, serve some of the same values as IP-free public domain 
resources, but they are significantly encumbered by underlying IP 
rights and license terms. As Professor Niva Elkin-Koren has 
observed, Creative Commons licenses impose significant costs on 
users of informational works.240 She worries about the unintended 
consequences for IP-free public domains that will flow from CC’s 
“licensing platform[, which] relies heavily on a proprietary system and 
on viral contracts.”241 By adopting this licensing platform, Creative 
Commons strengthens arguments made by proprietary vendors that 
the latters’ viral license terms restricting fair and other socially 
valuable uses should be enforced. An IP-free public domain, in 
contrast, lowers transactions costs and allows follow-on creators to 
use preexisting works far more broadly than CC licenses do. 
The public domains that Professors Lange, Cohen, and Birnhack 
have articulated are among the most imaginative and inspiring public 
domains in the literature.242 From their work, readers should take 
away a more dynamic and vibrant sense of the role of public domains 
 
 240. Elkin-Koren, supra note 193, at 3. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See supra notes 103–29 and accompanying text. 
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in creative work and public discourse. Their conceptions of the public 
domain give more life and robustness to the public domain of IP-free 
information resources (PD 2). All three aim to expand the bounds of 
this domain so that appropriations from preexisting works will more 
often be deemed legitimate reuse of ideas, rather than an improper 
appropriation of expression, from protected works. Professor Lee’s 
public domain also aims to enrich this same public domain of IP-free 
information resources, albeit in a different way; namely, by 
appreciating the significance of disclosure of secret government 
information and providing arguments for affirmative rights of the 
public in this domain.243 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Boyle was the first scholar to recognize and celebrate 
the existence of multiple public domains.244 In the past five years, even 
more public domains have emerged. This Lecture has identified 
thirteen public domains, offered reasons why public domains have 
proliferated, and suggested some commonalities among them as a 
means of facilitating discourse about them. 
Accepting the existence of multiple public domains allows 
context-sensitive meanings of “public domain” to evolve. It also 
contributes to a richer understanding of the contents of public 
domains, social values these information resources serve, persons and 
communities who care about public domains, the legal and 
institutional structures available to preserve them, threats that some 
public domains face, and strategies for responding to these threats. 
Professor Boyle may be right that scholars initially invented 
multiple public domains because of “the implicit fear or concern 
about intellectual property that each attempts to alleviate and the 
implicit ideal of the information ecology that each attempts to 
instantiate.”245 Public domain discourse has, however, taken on a life 
of its own, as public domain memes have spread widely via the 
Internet. As awareness has spread, public domains have become 
more dynamic, vibrant, and even fun than they were twenty years 
ago. Public domains will have an even richer and more robust future 
if members of the public continue to engage in creative uses of 
 
 243. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 244. Boyle, supra note 3, at 58–62. 
 245. Boyle, supra note 2, at 29. 
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information technologies via the Internet, implicitly following 
Professor Lange’s sage advice to be “at play in the fields of the 
word.”246 
 
 246. David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of 
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 139 (Spring 
1992). 
